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ABSTRACT
People often think that IFIs, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are
prominent players in the global economy by providing funds to countries in need of development
and sustainment of welfare, unfortunately these institutions can cause devastating effects in the
borrower country. The harsh conditionality of the IMF plays a huge role in the negative economic
consequences incumbent upon the borrower country. Meanwhile, the lack of legal remedies for
private individuals suffering from the conditionality aggravates the consequences for these
people. On the one hand, conditionality may strain the economy of the borrower country which
leads to impeding the government’s ability to fulfill their international obligations to provide certain
rights to their citizens. On the other hand, there are no available legal remedies for private
individuals neither in the international sphere or the domestic one. Internationally, IFIs flee
responsibility for the consequences of their policies in the borrower countries by escaping behind
the lack of adequate internal remedy mechanisms within these institutions and behind the
controversial adherence of the these institutions to the right to remedy established under
customary international law and to human rights. Domestically, these institutions cannot be held
accountable before domestic courts of the borrower country as they enjoy immunity. So the
burden of responsibility for the consequences of policies and conditionality imposed by IFIs is
shifted from the institution to the administrative bodies of the borrower state who implement the
conditionality of the institutions. This paper argues that private individuals suffer from the negative
consequences of loans conditionality given by IFIs by causing negative economic effects leading
to violations to the rights of private individuals that are supposed to be guaranteed by
international conventions due to the burden placed upon the borrower country. It further argues
that the lack of remedies deprives private individuals of their rights, as a right with no remedy is
no right at all.

Key Words: IFIs, IMF, World Bank, International Accountability, Customary International Law,
Human Rights, Right to Health, ICESCR, State Council, Supreme Constitutional Court
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I.

Introduction

The world has encompassed a well-established body of international instruments, which
enumerate a great spectrum of human rights, yet there are constant violations to these
rights due to lack of sufficient resources, despite the existence of international financial
institutions. These rights are affected by the surroundings where they are meant to be
exercised, most importantly the economic situation of a country. For example, a
government is required to have the capacity to allocate a percentage of its expenditure to
provide healthcare services to ensure fulfillment of the right to health. Meanwhile,
international financial institutions boost billions of dollars in funds to help countries
facing economic difficulties to achieve economic reform. However, the fund that Egypt
obtained from the International Monetary Fund in 2016 has been criticized for having
negative economic consequences; by which it stultify Egypt’s capacity to fulfill its
obligations under the constitution, specifically regarding the right to health.
Consequently, the controversial question that arises is to what extent could international
financial institutions, as the IMF, be held accountable? And what are the available
remedies for private individuals when their right to health has been breached?
Egypt has obtained an extended fund facility from the IMF in 2016, which incorporates
specific conditionality to achieve certain objectives as perceived by the IMF. The
conditionality that has been applied in Egypt are the devaluation of the Egyptian pound,
introduction of value-added tax (VAT), reduction of energy subsidies and containing the
public sector wage bill. 1 From the IMF’s perspective these conditions would lead to the
realization of certain objectives. These objectives could be summarized in increasing
international reserve, attracting investment, increasing tax revenue and decreasing
expenditure.2 However, this conditionality resulted in aggravating economic

1

IMF Press Release No. 16/501, 11 Nov.2016,
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2016/11/11/PR16501-Egypt-Executive-Board-Approves-12billion-Extended-Arrangement (last visited 29/03/2021).
2
IMF, Id.

consequences in a very short period of time. These consequences revolve around
unprecedented increase in rates of inflation, poverty and external debt. 3
There is a dilemma that international financial institutions’ policies in some cases cause
harm in the borrowing country accompanied by the lack of a well-established
accountability system for these institutions. Especially that there is an “increasing
demand and some movement toward ensuring that IOS take concrete steps to ensure their
accountability.”4 It is worth mentioning that some scholarly organizations as the ILA
have provided guidance on matters related to the accountability dilemma of IOS.5 So
there are several reasons calling for the urgent need of such accountability. First, they are
powerful organizations as they interfere in the domestic affairs of countries via
conditionality affecting social, political and macroeconomic matters.6 Second, they have
a weighed voting system granting influence to richer countries. 7 Third, there is a lack of
an adequate internal accountability mechanism system. The dilemma is even further
complicated due to the immunity enjoyed by these institutions along with the unclear
standing of these institutions from customary international law and human rights
considerations.
To have a clear understanding of the topic it is essential to consider the meaning of
accountability, responsibility and legal remedies. First from a linguistic perspective,
‘accountability’ means “the quality or state of being accountable, especially an obligation
or willingness to accept responsibility or to account for one’s actions.”8 While,
‘responsibility’ means the “quality or state of being responsible such as: moral, legal, or
3

World Bank, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/egypt/publication/economic-monitor-april-2019
(last visited 29/03/2021).
4
Ved P. Nanda, Accountability of International Organizations: Some Observations, Volume 33, Issue 3,
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y , pp 379–390 (2004), at 390,
https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/denilp33&i=389 (last visited 20/07/2021).
5
Ved P. Nanda, Id, at 390.
6
Susan Park, Designing accountability, international economic organisations and the World Bank’s
Inspection Panel, 64 Aust. J. Int. Aff. pp 13–36 (2010), at 15, https://doi.org/10.1080/10357710903459990
(last visited 15/3/2021).
7
Eisuke Suzuki & Suresh Nanwani, Responsibility of International Organizations: The Accountability
Mechanisms of Multilateral Development Banks, 27 MICH. J. INT. LAW, pp 177–226 (2005), at 184,
https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/mjil27&i=189 (last visited 16/3/2021).
8
Definition of Accountability, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/accountability (last visited
20/07/2021).
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mental accountability or something for which one is responsible: burden.” 9 Accordingly,
the difference is that ‘accountability’ focuses on results, which is the “duty to give an
account of tasks after they are completed,”10 so it is considered after a situation occurs.
Meanwhile, ‘responsibility’ focuses on tasks.11 The word ‘remedy’ means the “legal
means to recover a right or to prevent or obtain redress for a wrong.”12 Second from a
legal perspective, responsibility of international organizations according to the Report of
the International Law Commission on the Responsibility of International Organizations is
considered as a “breach of an international obligation and its consequences for the
responsible international organization.” 13 According to the International Law
Association, accountability of international organizations has different forms: “legal,
political, administrative, and financial,” 14 where the form upon which accountability
arises depends on the “particular circumstances surrounding the acts or omissions of IOS,
its member States or third parties.” 15 The ILA has further demonstrated that
Accountability is an overarching term, a notion which covers both a variety of
primary rules governing the conduct of 1Os and secondary rules to render
accountability operational vis-a-vis those entitled to raise it (means of redress). 16
The ILA has also referred to the accountability by being linked to the “authority or power
of an IO. Power entails accountability, that is the duty to account for its exercise.” 17
9

Definition of Responsibility, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/responsibility (last visited
20/07/2021).
10
Responsibility vs Accountability: What’s the Difference?, https://sprigghr.com/blog/hrprofessionals/responsibility-vs-accountability-whats-the-difference/ (last visited 20/07/2021).
11
Responsibility vs Accountability: What’s the Difference?, Id.
12
Definition of Remedy, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/remedy (last visited 20/07/2021).
13
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Sixty-Third Session, Draft Articles on the
Responsibility of International Organizations, with commentaries, pp 46-105, at 46,
https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_11_2011.pdf (last visited
15/07/2021).
14
Committee on Accountability of International Organisations, 68th Conference, Int'l L. Ass'n Rep.
Conf. (1998), pp 584-615, at 598, https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.ilarc/ilarc1998&i=1 (last visited
15/07/2021).
15
Committee on Accountability of International Organisations, 68th Conference, Int'l L. Ass'n Rep.
Conf. Id.
16
th
Committee on Accountability of International Organisations, 68 Conference, Int'l L. Ass'n Rep.
Conf. (1998), Id, at 610.
17
International Law Association Berlin Conference (2004), Accountability of International Organisations,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS LAW REVIEW,VOL 1, ISSUE 1, PP 221–293 (2004), at 225,
http://brill.com/view/journals/iolr/1/1/article-p221_15.xml (last visited 15/07/2021).
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Furthermore, the ILA pointed out that “responsibility of IOs may arise from noncompliance with any of the applicable bodies of law, while their liability will be
implicated when (significant) harm has been caused by any of the lawful activities carried
out by the IOs.”18 Moreover, the ILA has stated that the term ‘remedy’ is a form of
Acceptable outcome arrived at through a procedure instigated by an aggrieved
party and is intended to include, in addition to remedies of a formal kind, other
means of redress which might be more appropriate to the circumstances of the
case e.g. prospective changes of policy or practice by the IO.19

The problem of accountability of international financial institutions is of vital importance
as their policies touch millions of private individuals daily. This research is essential as it
generally examines the causes of the lack of accountability of these institutions and
specifically focuses on the effect of the IMF’s policies in Egypt in 2016 on the right to
health of Egyptians stated under the constitution and under the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In addition, not only does the research view the
problem from an international perspective, but also sheds the light on the available
remedies within domestic jurisdiction. So this research is helpful for practitioners in the
field of human rights, specifically the right to health, and for policy makers concerned
with finding solutions for the negative effects of the international financial institutions’
policies. This is because it identifies the causes of the dilemma to pave the way for
solutions. The study complements the already existing studies and adds to the literature in
this field by focusing on the effect of the IMF policies on the right to health of Egyptians
and on the accountability of the IMF in this regard from both an international and
domestic perspective.
This paper argues that international financial institutions flee accountability for the
negative consequences that might occur because of their policies that are implemented in
the borrower country. The argument focuses on the conditionality of the funds given to
the borrower country that may hinder the government’s capacity to fulfill its obligations
18
19

International Law Association Berlin Conference (2004), Id, at 245.
International Law Association Berlin Conference (2004), Id, at 263-264.

4

to provide and to protect human rights of its citizens. On one hand, their conditionality
revolve around the implementation of austerity measures that strain the government’s
budget and resources, resulting in lack of adequate resources to ensure the efficiency of
services required to attain human rights. On the other hand, international financial
institutions refuse to be held accountable for any negative consequences of their policies
based on the lack of sufficient remedies for harmed private individuals. The matter of
remedies is problematic on both the international and the domestic levels. Internationally,
these institutions fail to provide adequate internal remedy mechanisms for private
individuals harmed by the policies of the institution. In addition, these institutions argue
about their adherence to principles established under customary international law, as the
right to remedy is one of these well-established principles and are reluctant to consider
human rights in their operations. Meanwhile on the domestic sphere, these institutions
cannot be held accountable before domestic courts due to immunity demonstrated under
their constitutive instruments. Consequently, the paper argues that the burden of
responsibility of IFIs to ensure that their policies cause no harm and are consistent with
human rights considerations is shifted from the institution to that of the borrowing
country that implements the policies from which private individuals are harmed.
Part I describes the establishment of the IMF including the causes of its establishment,
objectives and principles as well as details the conditionality of the IMF concerning its
types, scope, rationale and criticism directed towards it. This provides a clear view of the
historical background of IFIs as the IMF. In addition it sheds the light on the evolution of
conditionality and clarifies the reasons behind the criticism directed against it. Part II
explores the accountability dilemma of international financial institutions as international
organizations concerning the internal mechanisms of legal remedies, where they stand
from customary international law and the legal framework for the establishment of IMF
responsibility. This part discusses the current available remedy mechanisms in IFIs and
explains the reasons for being inadequate for harmed private individuals. Furthermore, it
sheds the light on the debate of why IFIs are reluctant to abide by customary international
law, specifically regarding the right to remedy. Moreover, it emphasizes on the argument
that IFIs should consider human rights in their policies and provides answers for the
5

argument alleged by IFIs in order not to consider human rights. In addition, it details the
elements upon which responsibility of IOS as the IMF could be held and what hurdles the
completion of these elements in practice. Part III analyzes the effects of the extended
fund facility given to Egypt in 2016 by the IMF on the right to health of Egyptians
guaranteed by the Egyptian constitution and article 12 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, while presenting the available remedies for private
individuals within domestic law. This is considered an obvious recent example for the
negative consequences that might occur in a borrower country due to the implementation
of the IMF conditionality. It further examines the remedies available within the domestic
sphere due to the lack of a remedy mechanism on the international scale.

6

II.

Establishment of the International Monetary Fund

A. Historical Overview:
World War II was a turning point in history as the world is still experiencing its
consequences to date in politics and in global economy. In the political sphere, the Allied
countries won the war and the United States gained its position as the world’s great
power. This power has been accompanied by changes in global economy which started in
the Bretton Woods Conference that took place in the United States in July 1944. Driven
by the need to avoid the mistakes of the Great Depression and World War II,
representatives of 44 allied nations met to plan a new economic order based on global
cooperation.20 This Conference resulted in two main economic consequences upon which
current global economy is built. First, the Conference set up a system of exchange rate
linked to the dollar 21 instead of the gold standard. Accordingly the United States became
the world’s great economic power as it is the only country that can print dollars. Second,
the Conference agreed on the establishment of the International Monetary Fund “IMF” as
the supervisory body on the new exchange rate system. Since then the IMF has played a
crucial role in global economy and “became the key intergovernmental organization
underpinning the global financial system.” 22
The IMF is a well-established financial institution which has set its mandate, objectives
and principles. These bases reflect the vision of its founding fathers; its chief architects
were the famous British economist John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White of the
U.S. Treasury Department, while the main sponsors behind its establishment were the
United States and the United Kingdom. 23 In the founding fathers’ vision, the IMF “would
help member governments stabilize their currencies without resorting to the currency
controls that had disrupted international commerce since the 1930s.” Meanwhile,
20

The International Monetary Fund, https://www.imf.org/en/About/Timeline (last visited 1/3/2021).
The International Monetary Fund, Id.
22
Alexander E. Kentikelenis, Thomas H. Stubbs & Lawrence P. King, IMF Conditionality and Development
Policy Space 1985-2014, Review of International Political Economy, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 543-582, at 549,
https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2016.1174953 (last visited 2/3/2021).
23
Sarah L.Babb,Bruce G. Carruthers, Conditionality: Forms, Functions and History, Annual Review of Law
and Social Science, Vol 4, Issue 1, 12/2008, pp. 14-29, at 17,
http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.4.110707.172254 (last visited 1/3/2021).
21
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members of the IMF are “committed to pegging the value of their currencies to the U.S.
dollar, to making progress toward dismantling currency controls, and to consulting with
the IMF before engaging in currency devaluation. In times of temporary crisis, members
were entitled to draw on IMF resources to help stabilize their currencies.” 24 This vision
has been demonstrated in its mandate which is “the promotion of economic and financial
cooperation among its member countries.” 25 Moreover, to fulfill this mandate the IMF has
clearly laid out its objectives in article 1 of its articles of agreement. The highlights of
these objectives are “promoting international monetary cooperation, supporting the
expansion of trade and economic growth, and discouraging policies that would harm
prosperity.”26 The broad aims of these objectives are to promote and to maintain
employment and real income reached through the development of the productive
resources of all its members.27 Yet, to be able to reach its objectives the Articles of
Agreement has also stated the principles upon which the IMF should follow as a path for
these objectives. Article 1(v) stated these principles,

Which calls for the IMF to adopt policies on the use of its resources: (1) that
would assist members to overcome their balance of payments difficulties; (2) in a
manner consistent with the purposes of the institution; and (3) under adequate
safeguards to ensure that such use would be temporary. 28
This drives us to the core mission of the IMF which is assistance of its member
countries.

The assistance referred to in the principles of the IMF under article (1) of its articles of
agreement could be concluded in three main functions; economic surveillance, capacity
24

Sarah L.Babb,Bruce G. Carruthers ,Id.
Manuel Guitián, Conditionality: Past, Present, Future, Staff Papers (International Monetary Fund), vol.
42, no. 4, 1995, pp. 792–835, at 792, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/3867599 (last visited 1/3/2021).
26
The International Monetary Fund, Supra note 20.
27
Manuel Guitián, supra note 25, at 793.
28
Manuel Guitián, supra note 25, at 793. See article 1(v) which demonstrated that one of the IMF’s
purposes is “to give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund temporarily
available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with opportunity to correct
maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or
international prosperity.”
25
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development and lending. First under economic surveillance, the IMF monitors the
international monetary system and financial policies of its member countries by
highlighting “possible risks to stability and advises on needed adjustment policies.” 29
Second, the IMF works with governments to modernize their economic policies and train
their people to improve their economy and create more jobs. 30 Third, the IMF provides
loans for “member countries experiencing actual or potential balance of payments
problem to help them rebuild their international reserves, stabilize their currencies,
continue paying for imports, and restore conditions for strong economic growth, while
correcting underlying problems.” 31In this regard, the IMF provides three types of
arrangements, as there are loans given to impoverished countries and other loans given to
more developed ones. The first type dates back to 1951 and is called the Stand-By
Arrangement “SBA”. It is supposed to last for one or two years, but in many cases it
lasted longer.32 In the 1970s, the IMF recognized that many countries entered into several
consecutive SBAs, so it opened the Extended Fund Facility “EFF”, which is supposed to
last for around four years. 33 Last but not least, the IMF in the 1980s opened the Extended
Credit Facility that is targeted to develop economies in the poorest countries. 34

The various types of arrangements offered by the IMF are a response to the change in the
clientele since establishment till date. By having a glimpse on history, it is noted that the
number of IMF member countries has increased dramatically, which accordingly resulted
in a change in the type of economies that the IMF deals with. The IMF has initially
29

The International Monetary Fund, https://www.imf.org/en/About (last visited 1/3/2021). See article 1(i)
of the IMF articles of agreement which specifically stated that the purpose of the IMF is “to promote
international monetary cooperation through a permanent institution which provides the machinery for
consultation and collaboration on international monetary problems.”
30
The International Monetary Fund, Id. This reflects article 1(ii) which mentioned that “To facilitate the
expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and
maintenance of high levels of employment and real income and to the development of the productive
resources of all members as primary objectives of economic policy.”
31
The International Monetary Fund, Id. See article 1(v)(vi) of the IMF Articles of Agreement.
32
Axel Dreher, Jan-Egbert Sturm, James Raymond Vreeland, Politics and IMF Conditionality, The Journal of
Conflict Resolution, Feb 2015, vol. 59, no. 1, pp 120-148, at 123, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24546221
(last visited 1/3/2021).
33
Axel Dreher, Jan-Egbert Sturm, James Raymond Vreeland, Id.
34
Axel Dreher, Jan-Egbert Sturm, James Raymond Vreeland, Id.
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started with 28 countries in 1945,35 and has reached 190 member countries in 2021. 36 This
increase in member countries throughout the years has experienced two main
benchmarks. The first is the decolonization of Africa in the 1960s under pressure from
independence movements. In 1961, Egypt, Ethiopia and South Africa became member
countries and by 1969 another 34 countries joined the IMF.37 The second benchmark is in
the 1990s when the Soviet Union dissolved and by the collapse of communism, 20
formerly communist countries joined the IMF. 38 The increase in member countries with a
variety of different economies was reflected in the change in the IMF operations and its
evolution as it stands today. It is worth mentioning, that there was no lending programs in
the first seven years of the IMF’s establishment. 39 By the 1950s and the 1960s, the IMF
started its lending programs by short-term loans to advanced economies, 40 for example,
Belgium and Finland were the first countries to utilize IMF resources in 1952, while the
United Kingdom had 11 SBA between 1956 till 1977.41 In the 1970s, the IMF’s role
started reaching countries with a wider range of crisis, as between 1976 and 1983 the
IMF lending programs doubled targeting less developed countries. 42 This is correlated
with the oil and debt crises that occurred in the second half of the 1970s and 1980s.The
operations of the IMF has changed because the crises caused a shift in the identity of the
countries that make the most extensive use of the IMF services; as before the crises the
main clients were industrialized countries while after that the primary users became
developing countries.43 This explains the need for the emergence of the new types of
arrangements from short-term SBA to EFF and Extended Credit Facility.

35

Carmen M. Reinhart, Christoph Trebesch, The International Monetary Fund: 70 Years of Reinvention,
The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 30, no. 1, 2016, pp 3-27, at 6,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/43710008 (last visited 1/3/2021).
36
The International Monetary Fund, supra note 29.
37
The International Monetary Fund, supra note 20.
38
The International Monetary Fund, supra note 20.
39
Carmen M. Reinhart, Christoph Trebesch, supra note 35, at 7.
40
Carmen M. Reinhart, Christoph Trebesch, supra note 35, at 5.
41
Carmen M. Reinhart, Christoph Trebesch, supra note 35, at 8.
42
Carmen M. Reinhart, Christoph Trebesch, supra note 35, at 10.
43
Daniel D. Bradlow, The World Bank, the IMF, and Human Rights Symposium, Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems, vol. 6, no. 1, 1996, pp. 47-90, at 70,
https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/tlcp6&i=73 (last visited 1/3/2021).
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It is understood that the 190 member countries have joined the IMF to have access to the
benefits offered by the institution as helping countries to increase their opportunities in
development and economic expansion and to obtain IMF financial assistance, however;
the question that arises is where does the principle of sovereignty stand in the relation
between the IMF and member countries? On one hand, international organizations
established after the end of World War II were based on the principle of sovereignty as a
normal consequence to declare the end of a war and to put an end to the intervention in
countries domestic affairs. Only countries had the right to join these organizations and
had the vote in policymaking bodies in these organizations. 44 Based on the principle of
sovereignty, “international organizations were granted limited ability to intervene in the
domestic affairs of their member states.”45 On the other hand, the establishment of the
United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions were considered taking a step away
from the basis of absolute sovereignty. 46 This has been justified by the fact that member
countries have agreed to “surrender some aspect of its sovereignty in return for the
benefits it expected to derive from membership in these organizations.” 47 While shedding
the light on the IMF membership in particular, it is recognized that member countries
enable the IMF to intervene in its exchange rate and monetary policy, in order to benefit
from the IMF consultations, monitoring and lending. Furthermore, international financial
institutions over the years have increased their supervision and involvement in their
member countries affairs. Although, the IMF had the right to intervene in the affairs of its
member states, yet it has been criticized for being uneven in the treatment of its members.
This is because while the IMF “is able to exercise substantial control over the affairs of
its poorer member states, it has very little control over the behavior of its richer member
states.”48 This drives us to the core of the uneven treatment by the IMF which is
structured in the debatable issue of conditionality.
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B. Evolution of Conditionality:
The most essential purpose of the IMF is that it provides financial assistance in the form
of loans granted under specific conditions. This purpose is derived from Article 1(v) of
the IMF’s Articles of Agreement which explicitly stated that one of the IMF’s purposes is
to give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund
temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them
with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without
resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity. 49
Although the above mentioned article seems clear and straight forward at first sight, yet it
holds several aspects that hugely affect a lot of economies that have dealt or are dealing
with the IMF. The article specifies not only the role of the institution towards its member
countries, but has also specified the action that the borrower country is expected to
perform when taking the loan. And last but not least, it has stipulated that the assistance
provided must be “temporary” and “under adequate safeguards.” So this article created an
obligation for the IMF to ensure that these safeguards are fulfilled. Consequently; these
safeguards were “translated into operational procedures by means of Executive Board
decisions, which adapted the implementation of conditionality as the world and members’
economies evolved.”50 Hence, the article enumerated the elements of the financial
assistance equation. First, members who seek the financial assistance of the IMF must
have a payment need. These members must have an actual or potential balance of
payment need to be eligible to use the IMF resources, which could be referred to as an
“adjustment need.”51 Second, the member country is expected to adopt economic policy
measures to correct the imbalance, and this is referred to as “adjustment effort.” 52 In
essence, there has been a “general consensus that the IMF’s financial assistance should be
conditional on the adoption and implementation of adjustment policies.” 53 In a nutshell,
the IMF offers financial assistance to member countries facing balance of payment needs
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and in return the borrower country is expected to implement and adopt certain reform
policies named “conditionalities”, so that the IMF ensures that such assistance is
temporary and is adequately utilized.

The concept of conditionality imposed by the IMF on the borrower country has not been
the same since the institution’s establishment; it has evolved throughout the years. It is
worth mentioning that conditionality was not mentioned in the original 1944 Articles of
Agreement, thus “during its first half decade of existence, the IMF did not engage in
conditionality.”54 This is justified by the fact that the founding father of the IMF British
Economist John Maynard Keynes, representing the English position, has rejected the
concept of conditionality. 55 The rationale behind it is that Keynes had argued that “an
international institution should not be given the authority to regulate national policies by
withholding funds,”56 based on the respect of the principle of sovereignty. However, this
has been opposed by the US delegation, as the US believed that conditionality is
necessary to “prevent the IMF from being drained of its resources for purposes contrary
to its charter.”57 The IMF had both an adjustment role by encouraging countries to pursue
suitable adjustment policies and a financing role by supporting them with balance of
payments finance. 58 Despite not being part of the IMF’s original mandate, “by the early
1950s the two roles were linked by the conditionality attached to many of the Fund’s
loans.”59 Under US pressure the IMF adopted the principle of conditionality, where it
started its application in 1952 and has been “elaborated in explicit general decisions of
the Executive Board.”60
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After the adoption of the principle of conditionality in early 1950s, the principle has
evolved in the 1960s till the early 1980s under what is called the first and the second
general review of conditionality. First, the first general review of conditionality by the
Executive Board occurred in 1968, reviewing the conditionality activity that took place in
the 1950s and 1960s. It concluded and stressed on the importance of “ensuring adequate
safeguards to preserve the revolving nature of those resources and the need to allow for
flexible, yet uniform, treatment of all members.” 61 In the 1970s, countries started to face
more payment imbalances requiring longer periods of adjustment and larger amounts of
assistance than what is available under the SBA. In response to this need, the IMF
established an Extended Facility in 1974 to “provide member countries experiencing
severe balance of payments problems.” 62 Due to the new adaptations that took place in
the 1970s, the Executive Board conducted a second general review of conditionality in
1978-1979. The guidelines of this review stressed on the importance of early adjustment,
member countries must seek assistance once needed, the IMF must pay due regard to
variables that have a macroeconomic impact and that there should be periodic reviews for
conditionality practices, which has been taking place since then. 63 It is worth noting that
in the 1970s developing countries were able to borrow from private sources, accordingly
the IMF has lost some of its customers and loosened its conditionality, however; in the
1980s conditionality reappeared with vengeance but not for developed countries. 64 In the
1980s, the developing countries have faced debt-servicing difficulties, it was known as
the debt crisis. So the IMF intervened to resolve the crisis and broadened its scope of
conditionality practices by focusing on structural reforms and microeconomic measures
to ensure efficiency in resource allocation.65 Accordingly, the 1980s was a turning point
in IMF’s conditionality because of the occurrence of the unprecedented shift from
macroeconomic to structural conditionality. 66
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The change in the IMF conditionality practice in the 1980s marked the evolution of the
scope of conditionality. In 1985, the IMF has based its loans not only on traditional
macroeconomic reforms, but also on fundamental changes in national economies,
accordingly the IMF has established its own structural adjustment facility. 67 A decade
later, the IMF introduced a new form of structural conditionality which is linked to the
emerging standard of “good governance.” 68 Nowadays, IMF’s conditionality proliferated
as never before due to its wide scope, which for example includes but not limited to ;
central bank reform, exchange system, financial sector, government budget, monetary
ceiling, pricing, privatization, public sector, social sector, trade, wages and pension and
governance. Furthermore, the existence of multiple structural reforms in IMF programs
left conditions more complex, intrusive and difficult to enforce. 69

C. Types and Rationale of Conditionality:
In addition to the scope of conditionality, the IMF has established the types or
components of conditionality. These types are used to determine how and when the IMF
measures compliance to the conditionality it sets. First, there are the “prior actions” that
governments should take before the IMF makes the first loan disbursement. 70 In other
words, they are the reforms that the borrower government is required to implement before
it is eligible to receive the loan. Second, there is the “performance criteria” which include
fiscal deficit targets that the government should achieve throughout the loan arrangement
in order to ensure continued loan disbursements.71 It is a quantified criterion which is
used “to provide an objective indication of whether the agreed program of economic
policy reform is on track.”72 Third, there are the “structural benchmarks” which include
market-friendly or neoliberal reforms as trade liberalization and privatization and it also
includes governance reforms such as national bankruptcy legislation and judicial
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systems. 73 These structural reforms aim to change the overall architecture of national
and/or political systems to achieve economic growth goals and democratization. 74
Moreover, the most common types of structural reforms are in the fields of taxes and
revenue, expenditure policy, public wages and employment.75 Last but not least, there is
the “letter of intent” that includes qualitative aspects of policy reforms; this letter is
signed by the government to gain the IMF’s financial support.76

After laying out the definition of conditionality, a historical overview of its evolution as
well as its scope and types, the question that arises is what is the rationale behind the
principle of conditionality? On one hand, it is been argued that conditionality contains
moral hazard. This is because from one side the IMF provides financial assistance as
insurance to its member countries against sudden imbalances. 77 On the other side, there is
less determination on the part of the member country that it will adopt or maintain
appropriate policies. Accordingly, the IMF made “its resources conditional on the
implementation of adjustment measures” 78 so the risk of moral hazard is thus contained.
In a nutshell from the institutional interest view, the IMF allows access to its resources
when the borrower country adopts economic adjustment measures to assure that the
imbalance will be redressed. On the other hand, conditionality is a mean to protect the
IMF’s asset portfolio. Conditionality is a mere form of the “adequate safeguards” stated
under article 1(v) of the Articles of Agreement. It has been demonstrated that the need to
protect the asset portfolio of the IMF is because if the borrower country postponed the
adjustment effort that it should implement from its side and allows the imbalance to
grow, “the cost of correction are likely to increase, and with them, the risks embedded in
IMF financial support.”79 Moreover, a third reason for conditionality is the cooperative
nature of the IMF. Article 1(v) has also mentioned that the financial assistance must be
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“temporary” so that the resources would be revolving to the member country in need for
the financial assistance and to ensure this aspect this requires that the IMF’s “resource
portfolio exhibit a significant measure of liquidity.”80 Thus, from a national view IMF
conditionality contributes to the containment of adjustment costs to enhance economic
welfare and from an international perspective conditionality limits moral hazard risks,
protects its assets and safeguards the IMF’s monetary identity. 81

D. Criticism of Conditionality:
1. Reasons of Criticism:
Despite of the seemingly positive role that the IMF plays in the global monetary system,
yet there are harsh criticism directed against it. First, conditionality has been criticized for
being ineffective. The dilemma occurs because measuring the economic impact of IMF
programs is a controversial issue as the country seeking financial assistance and entering
into an IMF agreement is already in a crisis and “would therefore be expected to exhibit
worse than average economic performance thereafter.”82 Furthermore, cross national
quantitative studies suggest that “IMF programs seem to strengthen national balance-of –
payments but have little effect on inflation and a significantly negative effect on
economic growth.”83 Second, the IMF has been facing a legitimacy problem for two
reasons. On one hand, policies of the IMF are based on a shareholder model which
awards the majority rule to the wealthy industrialized countries headed by the United
States which has the largest vote.84 Meanwhile, these developed countries no longer
borrow from the IMF, so they are “not subject to the painful rigors of conditionality.” 85 In
a similar vein, the IMF has been criticized because “conditionality is less stringent when
loans go to countries considered strategically important by the IMF’s major
shareholders.”86 On the other hand, policies implemented by the IMF were virtually
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implemented in secret, which made conditionality to appear as procedurally illegitimate. 87
Third, the IMF has been opposed for not being neutral regarding the policy and advices it
offers. The institution’s reputation has been damaged during the Asian financial crisis of
1997-1998, where it is been said that the IMF’s policies are
Tainted by the vested interests of wealthy countries that control it, for example, in
the Asian financial crisis, Korea was forced to adopt policies that had little to do
with the problem at hand but that had long been advocated by powerful lobbyists
in the United States and Japan, such as reducing trade barriers to specific Japanese
products.88

2. Mission Creep:
The IMF and the WB were established with specific mandates, however; these mandates
have expanded dramatically. The most essential principle after World War II was the
principle of sovereignty. Countries at that time aimed to reach international peace
through respecting the sovereignty of each country. This explains the reason why states
which participated in the establishment of international organizations had a specific
vision regarding the basis upon which these organizations would function. Their view
was based on two premises. First, “was that the sovereign state was the most significant
actor in the international order.”89 This has not only meant that exclusively states could
join and participate in the affairs of these new organizations, but also international
organizations had limited ability to interfere in the domestic affairs of their member
states.90 Second, “most of the organizations should have mandates that are limited to
specific and defined set of problems.” 91 For example, if the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development deals with economic development issues, meanwhile,
the IMF is concerned with the monetary matters.92
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Today, the WB and the IMF have vigorously expanded their mandates. Although, the
WB was initially established to fund development projects, it became involved in a much
boarder range of activities. The WB today helps member states to draft statutes, reform
government institutions and economic sectors, as well as expects “their member states to
pay more attention to the social, environmental, cultural, and institutional implications of
their projects and programs.” 93 Similarly, the IMF has widened its range of activities in
the borrower country on two scales. First, the IMF is now concerned “with any
macroeconomic issues that could affect the balance of payments and exchange rate of a
country.”94 Second, the conditionality accompanying loans have been interfering in
various sectors of the borrower country that “could reduce the country’s ability to reduce
its budget and current account deficits.” 95 For example, it may impose conditions related
to the “privatization of a specific state owned enterprises and tax and pensions system
reforms.”96 Furthermore, the IMF helps countries to manage their sovereign debt crisis by
“using its ability to provide financing, to pressure either sovereign debtors or their
creditors to reach an agreement.”97 Accordingly, the IMF has expanded from solely being
an international monetary institution to a macroeconomic institution that “gets involved
in a broad range of advisory reviews, capacity building initiatives, and funding operations
in its member countries.”98 Moreover, this change in mandates and extending the scope of
activities to macroeconomic reforms were supported by the US, which was presented by
what was known as the “Baker Plan”. As at the WB/IMF meeting in 1985 James Baker,
the US Treasury Secretary, in response to the Third World Debt crisis called on the
“IMF, World Bank, and regional development banks to increase lending for structural
adjustment.”99 By overviewing this expansion in the activities of both the IMF and the
WB, it is noticed that they are “engaged in activities that involve decisions and actions
93
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that can directly influence the policies, projects and governance of their member
states.”100 In other words, they play a crucial role in the policy making and
implementation process of their member countries, by which their actions and decisions
directly affect citizens of these countries. 101
The expansion in the IMF and the WB mandates was linked to that the problems faced
my countries nowadays are interrelated. Problems include both domestic and
international dimensions, as “problems have become trans-nationalized, a proper
resolution to each problem, therefore, requires action on both the local and the global
level.”102 For example, IFIs will not manage to solve monetary problems and poverty
issues without simultaneously focusing on refugees’ problems, environmental
degradation, and “the capacity of the state to effectively and equitably manage its
resources, population policy, and human rights, including the status of women,
indigenous people and minorities.” 103 So it was said that the WB and the IMF “responded
to the intertwining of problems by broadening the scope of its activities.”104 These
institutions “have practically shifted their mandates from purely economic concerns in
the immediate post-war period to wider development-oriented functions.”105 The WB via
its loan negotiations and debates became “an active participant in the policy making
processes of its borrower countries.” 106 In the same vein, the IMF through implementing
surveillance, technical assistance and financing operations exerts influence “over the
policy making process in those member states that actually need, and think they might
need, access to IMF financing.” 107 Thus, the fact of the “mission creep” 108 undertaken by
the IMF and the WB has made these international organizations involved in what had
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previously been regarded as purely internal and domestic matters, resulting in the
undermining of the principle of absolute sovereignty. 109
In addition to the intertwining of problems, the expansion in the WB mandate was
justified in a famous legal opinion related to the prohibition of political activities in the
WB by Ibrahim Shihata, Former Senior Vice President and Special Advisor to the WB
President.110 He emphasized that the Bank is not authorized to interfere in the politics of
its member or “to be influenced by a member’s political ideology or character or form of
government.”111 He further stipulated that loan proceeds should be utilized “‘with due
attention to considerations of economy and efficiency’ and ‘without regard to political or
other non-economic influences or considerations’.”112 He demonstrated that the Bank
should not consider any political factors during its decision making process except when
“when such political factors lead to direct and obvious economic results relevant to the
Bank’s work.”113 In this case the Bank will take them into account labeled under
“economic considerations which only happened to have political causes or origins.” 114 He
has also addressed the assumption that the Articles of the WB assumed that a project’s
feasibility will not be judged based on political considerations, but on technical and
economic considerations.115 He clarified that by adopting a broad interpretation of
economic considerations then they “extend to the manner in which the state manages its
resources, and may thus become difficult to isolate from political considerations.” 116
However, this legal opinion is considered a double edged weapon. On one hand, it
justifies the interference in some of the domestic or political affairs of the borrower
countries. On the other hand, this legal opinion stands against the position of IFIs when
109
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required to consider human rights in their policies, but they claim that their constituent
instruments prohibits them from interfering in the political affairs of their member
countries. The matter of human rights is further detailed in the section titled (IFIs and
Human Rights).
To conclude, from a theoretical point of view the purpose of establishment of the IMF is
useful and essential to provide support for the global monetary system especially after the
consequences of World War II. However, from a practical real life point of view, the IMF
has been an institution holding a lot of controversies, particularly regarding the financial
assistance it provides and the conditionality accompanying it. This drives us to the next
chapter discussing the accountability of the IMF, from an international perspective, for
the negative consequences that could be incurred in the borrower country due to the
implementation of IMF policies.
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III.

Accountability of the International Monetary Fund

International organizations as the IMF “have become critical, even indispensable players
in modern international relations and international law.” 117 This is because they are vested
huge power by which they interfere in global economy and accordingly their policies
implemented in the borrower countries affect millions of people. So the crucial question
that arises is how could these institutions be held accountable in case private individuals
are harmed by their policies? To answer this question from an international perspective
we must consider three issues. First, we must explore the reasons that call for the
accountability of the IMF and the WB. Second, it is essential to assess the efficiency of
the already available internal review mechanisms provided by the WB and the IMF.
Third, we must examine the international responsibility of the IMF from three
perspectives which are; their standing from customary international law, their level of
adherence to human rights and lastly the legal framework for establishing the IMF
responsibility.
A. Reasons for Accountability:
As previously mentioned, in light of the ILA view of accountability of IOS it briefly
means that IOS as the IMF should bear the duty to account for its exercise, these
exercises include the policies accompanying the financial assistance provided to the
borrower countries in the form of conditionality. The IMF’s responsibility arises in case
they violated their international obligations and it may even be held liable if their policies
caused harm even if implemented within a lawful framework. This paper sheds the light
on the debatable issue of conditionality of the IMF, which continuously includes austerity
measures. A study for different types of government programs over a period of 10 years
found that the IMF underestimates the harms resulting from austerity measures
accompanying conditionality and overlooked the negative consequences and damage
resulting from decreasing public health budgets.118 Another study demonstrated that in
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the period between 2006 and 2010 “nine of the 18 countries in an IMF case study sample
were subject to program conditionality” 119 that resulted in affecting the prices of products
consumed by the poor.120 The problem is that the IMF tries to flee from the accountability
by claiming that its conditionality covers the design of the program that cover
macroeconomic and structural policies as well as the “tools used to monitor progress
towards the goals outlined by the country in cooperation with the IMF.” 121 So from the
IMF’s perspective the borrower country is responsible for “selecting, designing, and
implementing the policies that will make the IMF supported program successful.” 122
Consequently, the problem is in establishing the line of responsibility. 123 This leads to the
importance of stating the reasons behind the need to hold the IMF accountable for its
policies.
The wide scopes of activities of the IMF and the WB, where their decisions have a direct
impact on individuals and communities, have raised the issue of accountability of these
institutions. There are a lot of scholars forming a large scale in the literature urging “for
greater transparency, legitimacy, accountability, and democracy of global governance,” 124
for International Economic Institutions, which include the IMF and the WB. It is worth
mentioning, that when the IMF and the WB were demanded to increase their focus on
human rights issues, this was met by denial based on two grounds from their view. 125
First, they claimed that according to their constituent documents they were not entitled
“to take human rights considerations into account while designing their policies and
programs.”126 Second, the WB alleged that “there is an explicit prohibition on
interference in the political affairs of any member of the organization.” 127 While, the IMF
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interpreted article IV (3) (b) of its Articles of Agreement which states that “these
principles shall respect the domestic social and political policies of members, and in
applying these principles the Fund shall pay due regard to the circumstances of
members,”128 as prohibiting it from “being influenced by political (that is non-economic)
considerations in its dealings with its member states.”129 However, these arguments have
been highly criticized and did not gain acceptance among critics. Because these
organizations impose conditionality to accept funding the borrower countries that are not
related to economic issues like “governance, corruption, budgetary allocations, and the
relationship between the state and markets.”130 So it is out of question that these
institutions are not concerned with social and political matters.
The interference of the IMF and the WB in the domestic affairs of the borrower countries
along with the unwelcoming attitude of these organizations to be held accountable, in
case their decisions had a negative impact on individuals, have increased the controversy
of the accountability issue for these organizations. One of the rules for a successful
market system is that decision making is linked to risk. 131 However, IFIs decisions are
delinked from financial responsibilities. Although, these institutions determine their
client’s policies, they reject to share the risks resulting from these policies. 132 Moreover,
they “insist on full repayment, even if damages caused by their staff occur.” 133 Not only
do IFIs flee from accountability in case of negative consequences of their decisions, but
also in certain cases they might gain from these errors “by extending new loans necessary
to repair damages done by prior loans.” 134 For example, Brazil has obtained a loan from
IBRD amounting $240 million, which has resulted in considerable environmental
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damage. 135 Ironically, the Bank officials admitted that they erred and to repair the
damages resulting from the first loan, they lent Brazil another $200 million. 136 The final
outcome was that Brazil’s external debts increased by $440 million, while the IBRD
increased its income. 137 In addition to the delinking between decisions of IFIs and its risk,
another controversy is the means by which efficiency of a loan or program is measured.
Logically, the mechanisms by which effects are measured provide different results. 138 It is
said that the IMF comes up with different assessments of programs effects than what
observers conclude, as the Fund prefers to render positive results. 139 It is obvious that IFIs
oppose being held accountable for their decisions to protect themselves from any losses,
but the issue is that such protection is “done at the expense of particularly poor clients,
whose scarcity of experts has often made them extremely dependent on solutions
elaborated by IFI staff.” 140
The rise in the demand for accountability of the WB and the IMF was built on specific
rationale and principles. The most essential reason for the calls of accountability is that
the WB and the IMF are “considered to be more powerful than non-economic
international organizations as a result of their activities in spreading globalization.” 141
These institutions are powerful because they deal with macroeconomic matters and
interfere in the domestic affairs of states which are in need for funding. So they act in a
superior way with the borrower countries. But interestingly, that was the same reason that
the IMF and the WB presented to escape accountability. Accountability is usually
accompanied by the principle of transparency, where pertinent information about the
project for which project-affected people demand accountability must be disclosed. 142
However, the WB and the IMF have followed a different path regarding accountability
and transparency as they “justified their lack of information disclosure on the basis of the
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nature of their work with sensitive macroeconomic and financial policy questions of
member states.”143 Another reason for the importance of accountability is that these
financial institutions have weighed voting system, which gives “powerful states more
influence and therefore more interest in utilizing these institutions.”144 The IMF and the
WB voting system is based on “each member’s capital subscription to the financial
resources of the organization.” 145 These institutions “weigh each member’s voting power
according to the size of its capital subscription.”146 This means that the “United States,
Japan, Germany, France and Britain hold most votes and therefore have greater sway.” 147
Accordingly, not all member countries stand on the same footing. Richer countries have a
huge impact on these institutions and could easily influence their decisions and policies
by the weight of their voting power. It is argued that the mentioned powerful states, who
have most of the voting power and influence over these institutions became less
accountable for their decision making within the IMF and the WB over time “as the costs
of implementing their demands have shifted to borrower states who have less voting
power.”148 Not only there are reasons for urging accountability of the WB and the IMF,
but also there are principles and objectives aimed to be reached in this regard. First,
accountability of these institutions is to promote more transparency in their operations. 149
Second, accountability is needed to allow more access to information and to permit
“beneficiary participation in designing and implementing projects.”150 Third,
accountability is aimed to reach an independent investigation of the claims of projectaffected people.”151 Last but not least, accountability is necessary to increase these
institutions credibility. 152
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The expansion of the IMF and the WB mandates and the importance to hold these
institutions accountable for their decisions, in case it caused any harm in the borrower
country, raises the question of what are the current available legal remedies in
international law.
B. Internal Review Mechanism at the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund:
The legal remedy provided by an international organization, specifically the IMF and the
WB differs according to the harmed party’s relation with the organization. In this regard,
we must differentiate between four main relations, namely; employees working at these
organizations, creditors, suppliers and consultants of the IO, consumers, and finally
private individuals and communities. First, in case of employees of an IO who want to
seek an effective remedy for an employment- related claim, they may resort to the
administrative tribunals in the IO.153 Second, creditors, suppliers, and consultants of an IO
may seek remedy based on their contractual relationship with the IO, where most of these
contracts include an arbitration clause, if the matter was not settled via negotiations. 154
Third, consumers similar to the situation of the creditors and suppliers rely on their
contractual rights in case of disputes with the IO. 155 However, in case of disputes
settlement mechanism there is a difference between the WB and the IMF in this regard.
The WB loan agreements encompass an arbitration clause, while the IMF’s financial
transactions with its member states are not based on contracts.156 Accordingly, the IMF
lacks a dispute settlement mechanism, so disputes are settled through negotiations or at
the Executive Board level. In the latter case, the “Board member representing the
member state or the member state itself will present its case in the Board discussion.”157
The fourth category of relationship with the IO is the most controversial one, which is
concerned with private individuals and communities. This category includes non-state
actors who do not have a contractual relationship with the organization. For example,
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groups alleging that they have been harmed by the IMF conditionality or communities
which claim that they have been harmed by WB funded projects.158 Third parties fall out
of the scope of the contractual relationship between the borrower country and the IO, so
“individuals are outside the system of this contractual agreement.”159 The controversy
occurs because most of IOS activities “affect life and work of private parties,” 160 yet the
“real question of accountability towards people who are affected by MDB’s projects has
become sidelined.”161
Consequently, to have a more detailed vision for the controversy of harmed private
individuals and communities, it is essential to observe the current available legal
remedies for these people, in particular, offered by the IMF and the WB.
1.World Bank Inspection Panel:
The WB inspection panel is considered a benchmark in the path of IOS with regard to
available legal remedies and dispute settlement mechanisms. For that reason, it is
important to shed the light on the causes of its establishment, its scope and the critique
addressed towards it.
a. Establishment of the WB Inspection Panel:
The incident that triggered the establishment of the WB inspection panel was the Sardar
Sarovar Dam and Canal projects on the Narmada River in India, which was known as
‘Narmada projects’. This project was funded by the WB and “involved the forced
relocation and resettlement of more than 120,000 people and resulted in significant
environmental harm.”162 The project would result in that thousands of people will lose
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their homes and “vast areas of forest and agricultural land would be inundated.” 163 In
spite that the construction of this dam was considered “one of the largest water projects in
human history,”164 yet it would result in “expropriation of approximately 117,000
hectares of land”165 along with the forced removal of thousands of people.
Despite that civil society groups had very serious concerns about the social and the
environmental negative consequences of this project, the WB continued to fund it
throughout the 1980s.166 In 1984, the Bank agreed to fund the project with $450
million. 167 Due to continued opposition where “Indian and international civil society
groups mobilized in protest,”168 because the Bank did not consider the “environmental
and social degradation, rehabilitation, resettlement and violations of indigenous people’s
rights.”169 From this point, NGOs increased their demands for “an independent
mechanism that would respond to and investigate complaints from project-affected
people.”170 In response to the protests and civil society pressure, the World Bank agreed
to establish an independent commission to review the Narmada project in 1991,171 known
as the Morse commission.172 The commission have stipulated that there are “serious
compliance failures and documented devastating human and environmental consequences
of the violations.”173 The commission found that the Bank “disregarded its policies on
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involuntary resettlement and environmental assessment.” 174 The WB internal reports have
shown that the Bank failed to “achieve its organizational goals of poverty alleviation and
environmental protection.” 175 An internal review report of the WB issued in 1992
concluded that the WB was “suffering from a performance crisis with almost 40 percent
of projects scoring unsatisfactory ratings.”176 It further stipulated that the Bank “failed to
complete, or require the borrower to complete, the environmental impact studies required
by Bank procedures.”177 Moreover, in 1993 both the Center for International
Environmental Law and the Environmental Defense Fund presented to “a U.S.
Congressional committee a detailed proposal for an independent appeals board” 178 to
allow affected persons to implement the Bank’s environmental policies. In the same year,
the US Congress “identified the creation of an Inspection Panel as a key condition for
continued funding of the Bank’s concessional loan fund.” 179 Accordingly and in response
to the increased civil society pressures and member states demands for the WB to address
the issue of its lack of accountability for those affected by its action, the WB established
its inspection panel in 1993.180 It was established to provide a resort to people affected by
WB funded projects to raise their claims about their environmental and social concerns
caused by these projects.181 There is a view considering that the establishment of this
panel is a revolutionary act in the law and practice of international organizations because
it disrupted the normal channels of accountability in international law. 182 In other words,
its establishment was to “bridge a gap between international institutions and private
individuals,”183 as the panel was the first mechanism that entailed the right to citizens to
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bypass their national governments and file complaints against the WB. 184 Thus, the state
representatives of the Board of the WB are no longer the “sole channel for discourse
between the Bank and those communities and people affected by Bank projects.” 185
b. Scope of the Panel:
The WB inspection panel is considered the first of this kind of mechanism. It is regarded
as “a watershed moment in international legal jurisprudence” 186 because it creates a new
forum which allows private actors, who are in a non-contractual relationship with the
WB, to hold it directly accountable for consequences of its failure. 187 The inspection
panel is a “permanent, quasi-independent body that receives complaints about violations
of Bank policies directly from local people affected by Bank’s financed projects.” 188 Due
to the novelty of the mechanism, several aspects had to be defined like the scope and
mandate of this panel, the eligible complaint requester, basis of the complaint, and
composition of the panel.
The mandate of the WB inspection panel is limited to the “examination of the World
Bank compliance with its policies and procedures, it allows third parties to participate in
the decision making process of the organization for the first time.” 189 So, the panel
provides people directly and adversely affected by the WB funded projects with a
mechanism to request the Bank to act in compliance with its policies and procedures.190
Moreover, the WB had specified that the eligible requester to submit a claim of
compliance to the panel “must be an affected party in the territory of the borrower which
is not a single individual (i.e., a community of persons such as an organization,
association, society or other grouping of individuals).”191 Another crucial aspect that the
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inspection panel specified is the basis of complaint. The WB inspection panel has
detailed such basis where it stated that the affected party:
must demonstrate that its rights or interest have been or are likely to be directly
affected by an action or omission of the Bank as a result of a failure of the Bank
to follow its operational policies and procedures with respect to the design,
appraisal and/or implementation of a project financed by the Bank (including
situations where the Bank is alleged to have failed in its follow-up on the
borrower’s obligations under loan agreements with respect to such policies and
procedures) provided in all cases that such failure has had, or threatens to have, a
material adverse effect.192
In this context, it is obvious that the WB inspection panel requires a causal link between
the material damage suffered by the requester of the complaint and the Bank’s failure to
comply with its policies and procedures. Accordingly, the complaint must establish the
link between the harm suffered and the Bank’s failure to adhere to operational policies
and procedures.193 So the inspection panel’s role is emphasized in addressing actual or
potential harm that has been suffered by local populations. 194 Furthermore, this
requirement has been explicitly confirmed in the Second Review of the WB inspection
panel, which concluded that the panel will only investigate material adverse effect which
was caused due to the Bank’s total or partial failure with its policies and procedures. 195 It
is said that this causal link requirement acts as relieve “from potential liability for damage
arising from activities that are otherwise lawful or involve no wrongful acts.” 196
Last but not least, the composition of the panel was thought to achieve its independence.
It is composed of three members “from different nationalities who have independence
from the Bank’s management”197 by directly reporting to the Board of Executive
Directors, along with a panel’s secretariat to support the panel’s investigation. 198
Accordingly, the panel is independent from the Bank Management which is assigned
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with promoting and developing Bank financed projects.199 Another step towards
independence of the panel is that its members are required to neither have served the
Bank in any capacity for the two years preceding their selection nor can they work for the
Bank again after serving on the Panel for a five year term.200
There is also a specific process for the investigation claims submitted by eligible
requesters. It starts when the panel receives a complete request for inspection, which it
then forwards to the Bank’s Management and waits for the authorization of the Executive
Directors. Once the authorization is received the panel “enjoys broad investigatory
powers, including access to all Bank staff, documents, and the project site.” 201 After
completion of the investigation process, the panel issues its report to evaluate the Bank’s
compliance with it policies and procedures, which the Management must respond to and
submit its recommendations and report to the Executive Directors.202 Finally, the outcome
of the panel, Management and Executive Directors must be published. 203 However, it is
worth noting that the establishment of the WB inspection panel was unwelcomed by the
Bank management, where a scholar mentioned that “Bank management resented the
panel’s scrutiny and strongly resisted being held accountable.”204 Furthermore, the
management tended to deny the occurrence of policy violations, not only to escape
responsibility, but also to blame the borrowing government for these violations. 205 In
addition, the Bank’s management challenged eligibility of the claimants and “proposed
actions plans as alternatives to panel investigations.”206 Obviously, the Panel and Bank’s
staff relationship is strained because the staff does not want to be held accountable. The
Bank staff and management consider the panel “as captured by civil society organizations
who seek to second guess their professional judgement.”207
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c. Inspection Panel Shortcomings:
Despite the seemingly positive role of the WB inspection panel and being the first
remedy mechanism among IOS, it has been highly criticized for not meeting the expected
standards of transparency, independence and adequacy. The main criticism addressed
towards the inspection panel is that it does not have the power of enforcement, lacks the
power to exercise oversight over the implementation of remedial measures and lacks “the
ability to assess whether Management’s proposed remedial measures satisfy the concerns
of the claimants and/or bring the project into compliance.” 208 Thus, the lack of an
enforcement provision leaves it “up to the Bank and borrowers to heed up the panel’s
recommendations.”209 So the inspection panel lacks a system of redress, because even if
the people have rights derived from the policies of the Bank, they are usually denied
effective remedy. 210
This leads to the second shortcoming of the inspection panel which is that the panel’s
restricted authority “undermines any consequences from accountability.”211 The problem
lies in the limited mandate of the panel, as it is limited to conducting investigations and
reporting the findings of non-compliance of the Bank’s policies and procedures to the
Board of Directors, which later on becomes publically announced. 212 These policies and
procedures “pertain to how the Bank makes and implements decisions, rather than to the
actual content of the decisions.” 213 This limited mandate extended further as the panel
cannot review non-compliance with Guidelines and Best Practices, where it has been
explicitly excluded from the panel’s constituent resolution. 214 In addition, the panel is
unauthorized to consider violations of international law. 215 The panel may neither
implement recommendations nor may it require a specific action from the Bank’s staff to
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have an action plan or to respond to the findings. 216 The power to authorize or deny an
investigation conducted by the panel lies within the authority of the Board of Directors. 217
Furthermore, even if the investigation is authorized the findings are submitted to the same
Board of Executive Directors.218Accordingly, the panel has limited power to grant relief
as “it is up to the Board, after reviewing the panel’s report of its investigations, to
announce whether remedial measures will be undertaken.”219 This means that the panel
cannot impose sanctions, nor recommend changes in future cases based on lessons learnt
and cannot provide remedy for affected people as the investigation report is left to the
Bank staff and Board of Directors discretion. 220 This is linked to the bank’s interference
problem as the Bank “tends to be defensive, denying violation of policies, challenging
claimants’ eligibility, and in some cases challenging the panel’s findings.” 221 The Panel
being solely limited to advisory powers leads to the fact that Bank staff may marginalize
the role of the Panel, if the staff considers that the Panel is too responsive for the interest
of the complainants.222
From another perspective, the panel has been criticized for having various links with the
Bank that might compromise its independence. 223 These links are that first, the panel is
located at the Bank’s headquarters in Washington DC. 224 Second, despite the panel’s
budget is distinct from the Bank, “but these funds are drawn from bank resources.”225
Third, the panel is assisted by the Bank’s administrative staff and an executive secretary
that gets chosen by the Bank’s president after consultation with the bank’s executive
directors.226 Consequently, the panel is not independent in the strict legal sense.227
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Another major shortcoming is that procedures of the panel in receiving complaints are
only partially fair.228 On one hand, the complaining party may present information to
support the complaint.229 On the other hand, the complaining party is not “necessarily
given an opportunity to respond to the evidence and arguments presented by the IO’s
management.”230 Because the Board and Management “retain final decision making
powers,”231 as the panel cannot provide remedy because it only has “investigatory and/or
advisory powers, and their findings and recommendations are non-binding.”232 Moreover,
the complaining party has no right to appeal the panel’s recommendations or the Board’s
decisions. 233 In a similar vein, there is unequal access to panel procedures.234 Because it is
criticized that although the Bank management has “the opportunity to provide
recommendations to rectify the policy violations, the claimants do not have a similar right
to suggest remedial measures.”235 To conclude, a former WB inspection panel member
said that the panel “was unable to fulfill some of the central hopes of those who initiated
it,”236 in reference to the impartiality of the panel’s procedures and its lack of
independence from the Bank’s management. It has been suggested that the panel “should
move towards effective problem solving and greater accountability.” 237
2. IMF Independent Evaluation Office:
The IMF has no inspection panel as the WB, but it has established an independent
evaluation office. Its establishment was a response to the outbreak of ‘IMF riots’ that
took place during the period between the 1970s to the 1990s, in addition to the Asian
financial crisis.238 The IMF was criticized that its loan conditionality was “instrumental in
furthering economic crisis and social unrest in borrowing states, contributing to a loss of
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institutional legitimacy for the organization.” 239 The establishment of the office was to
assess the Fund’s effectiveness and to promote the IMF’s external credibility.240 In spite
that the independent evaluation office accepts the submission of suggestion for
evaluations to the office, “its intended purpose was never to be a dispute resolution
mechanism for other stakeholders.” 241
C.

International Responsibility of the IMF as an International

Organization:
After laying out the available so-called remedies currently offered by the WB and the
IMF, it is essential to evaluate the reasons behind the absence of any other remedy
channels for private individuals, groups and communities who are negatively affected by
these organizations. In this respect, the light will be shed on the standing of IOS from
customary international law, specifically regarding the right to remedy. Also, the level of
adherence of IFIs to human rights consideration will be considered. Finally, the legal
framework for establishing the IMF responsibility will be examined.
1. Controversy of Customary International Law and IOS:
The aim of establishment of IOS in the first place was to maintain peaceful and
cooperative relations between states from political and economic perspectives. Although,
it is assumed that the citizens of these states are the main target, who should benefit from
the organizations’ policies and benefit from funds in case of IFIs. Ironically, private
individuals are the only stakeholders who are left without any mechanism in case they are
harmed from the IFIs decisions. The lack of adequate internal mechanisms in the WB and
the IMF that may provide individuals with the right to complaint and seek remedy, along
with the immunity granted to IOS behind which they flee accountability before domestic
courts, have ripped private individuals from their right to seek remedy when harmed. The
controversial aspect in this respect is where does IOS stand from customary international
law?
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There is an argument that contends that IOS are not bound by customary international
law. This argument started by claiming that the WB “standards are not international law
and thus any non-compliance does not implicate the right to remedy.” 242 The argument’s
basis is that the Bank’s performance standards were not negotiated with the intention to
create a binding treaty.243 These standards are merely regulations of an IO to govern “the
organization’s behavior and the behavior of those entities that want to borrow from it.” 244
They are not considered custom or general principles of law, so they are not international
law as defined by the ICJ Statute.245 In addition, it is argued that the WB inspection panel
framework falls outside the scope of article 38 of the ICJ Statute and public international
law, considering the Bank’s safeguard policies as soft law. 246 Article 38 states that the ICJ
will decide on disputes based on: (1) international conventions (2) international custom
(3) general principles of law recognized by civilized nations (4) judicial decisions and
teachings.247 It is worth mentioning that IFIs have also tried to escape responsibility by
incorporating a disclaimer provision in their agreements “whereby the organization
disavows any liability.”248 In this regard, private individuals may raise claims “against the
host government within domestic judicial processes, to do so is to substitute the
responsibility of an international organization for that of the host state.”249 This argument
is derived from the notion that IOS were originally dealing with member states only and
private individuals were out of the scope of this relationship, because member states were
considered representatives of the rights of their citizens in IOS. 250
There is a well-mounted counter argument that challenges the basis of the above
mentioned argument. IOS “have their own independent legal personality and status as
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subjects of international law.”251 This is based on the fact that IOS have rights and duties
incorporated in their constitutive instruments under international law. 252 Moreover, an
international legal personality “is an indispensable requirement for an entity which
aspires to be an active participant in the international legal system.” 253 For example, they
have the capacity to sue by issuing a claim in the territory of a member state and on the
international scale they are bound by treaties to which they are a party and by their
articles of agreement.254 In addition, the advisory opinion of the ICJ on the interpretation
of 25 March 1975 between WHO and Egypt of ICJ report of 1980 stated that:
International Organizations are subjects of international law, and as such, are
bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of
international law, under their constitutions or under international agreements to
which they are parties. 255
Similarly, in the advisory opinion of the ICJ on the Legality of the Use by a State of
Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, the court mentioned that
The Court need hardly point out that international organizations are subjects of
international law which do not, unlike States, possess a general competence.256

Accordingly, IOS are bound by customary international law. And since the “right to
effective remedy enjoys universal acceptance with the requisite of state practice and
opinion juris.”257 Furthermore, the right to remedy is stipulated in several international
instruments258 as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 259 International Covenant
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on Civil and Political Rights, 260 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights,261 International Covenant on the Elimination of all forms of Racial
Discrimination,262 in addition to regional human rights treaties as the American
Convention on Human Rights. For example, Article (8) of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights stated that “everyone has the right to an effective remedy.” 263 Meanwhile,
article (10) of the same Declaration demonstrated that “everyone is entitled to a fair and
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights
and obligations.”264 Also, there is no state that objected to the principle of the right to
remedy as seen as a principle of customary international law. 265Not only has this right
been part of state practice, but also fulfilled the requirement of being a legal obligation
(opinio juris), to be regarded as customary international law. 266 So it is a “legally binding
obligation on all subjects of international law, including IOS.” 267 Even if it is alleged that
IFIs are not signatories to the mentioned human rights conventions, it is proven that the
right to remedy is a customary international right to private individuals and subjects of
international law, including IFIs. 268 Last but not least, article (3) of the International Law
Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of IOS states that “every internationally
wrongful act of an international organization entails the international responsibility of
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that organization.”269 Moreover, a principle has been established in this regard in the
advisory opinion by the ICJ on Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a
Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, where the Court mentioned that
[...] the Court wishes to point out that the question of immunity
from legal process is distinct from the issue of compensation for
any damages incurred as a result of acts performed by the United
Nations or by its agents acting in their official capacity….The
United Nations may be required to bear responsibility for the
damage arising from such acts.270
Despite that the right to remedy is a well-established principle under customary
international law and guaranteed by several international instruments, yet the IMF and
the WB are reluctant to adhere to this principle. So the question that arises afterwards is
what is the relation between IFIs; as the WB and the IMF, and human rights?

2. IFIs and Human Rights:
It is presumed that the financial assistance granted by IFIs as loans by the IMF or
developmental projects supported by the WB are to improve the economic condition of
the borrower country and consequently private individuals would benefit, however, there
is a strong argument that contends that conditionality accompanying loans given by the
IMF negatively impacts private individuals, particularly affecting human rights. Yet, the
argument is not solely regarding the conditionality but extends further to the position of
the IFIs towards considering human rights in their policies and agreements with the
borrower country.
a. Impact of IFIs Policies on the Borrower Country:
A shocking but true fact about the impact of the IMF on the borrower country was said
by the Argentine President Nestor Kirchner while negotiating “his country’s way out of
an imminent multi-billion dollar defaults due to the International Monetary Fund
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(IMF)”271 that if the full repayment was demanded, the cost would be “the hunger of the
Argentine people.”272 The default payment is just an example that reflects the extent to
which the IMF could have a huge impact on the borrower country.
From the IMF’s perspective, the conditions imposed on the borrower country to obtain a
loan are to achieve certain objectives as “making the fiscal and debt situation sustainable,
improving competitiveness, and boosting economic growth.”273 These objectives are
translated into certain measures required to be implemented by the borrower government
as “privatization of public assets, public spending cuts (or ‘austerity), and structural
reforms (such as changes to labor markets reforms, trade liberalization).” 274 The problem
is that the mentioned austerity measures required by IMF policies not only lead to
“reducing national policy space and undermining national development agendas,” 275 but
also “have implications for the enjoyment of human rights.”276 Furthermore, it has been
argued that the IMF conditionality has an adverse impact on the economic growth of the
borrower country as the structural adjustment imposed by the IMF causes a lot of damage
to the poor people in the society. 277 This is because structural adjustments lead to
reduction in the size of the ‘economic pie’ to be distributed, resulting in unequal
distribution of the pie itself. 278 So, “lower levels of economic development have been
associated with reduces respect for human rights.”279
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The huge intervention of the IMF and the WB in the borrower government’s
developmental plans and strategies via conditionality affects human rights of private
individuals. For example, the WB might require huge alteration in a specific area to build
a dam for instance, then the rights of the local people might be highly jeopardized,
despite that building the dam might improve the human rights of other people. 280
Similarly, the economic development required to be reached in the IMF objectives
through cutting government spending or increase in the cost of accessing essential
services violates the rights of people depending on those services, “even if the economic
reforms lead to greater prosperity for the country as a whole.” 281

These austerity measures negatively impact economic and social rights. From the point of
view of the IMF conditionality secures investment that stabilizes the economy, but from
the view of the harmed private individuals in the borrower country it aggressively
impacts the exercise of socio-economic rights.282 The cut in government spending such as
welfare and social services along with the removal of government subsidies to utilities
and services as water or health care could harm private individual human rights. 283 This is
proved by the UN Special Rapporteur on foreign debt and human rights after a mission to
Greece in 2013 that:
Socioeconomic rights are under threat or being undermined by austerity measures
that the Greek government has been required to implement since May 2010 in
return for bailouts.284
Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur in the Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Danilo Turk, who concluded that:
User fees and cost recovery for basic services (in which category he included
education, basic health, water and sanitation) cause reduced demand for those
services among the poor, leading to worse human rights outcomes. 285
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The field of human rights includes several rights, but the light will be shed on the impact
of the IMF conditionality on the right to health. On one hand, under human rights law,
states are obliged to provide the highest attainable standard of health by providing access
to health care for those who are unable to pay like the poor, vulnerable and marginalized
groups.286 On the other hand, the austerity measures imposed by the IMF as user fees for
basic health care or safe and potable water affect the ability of the marginalized groups to
access these services, which contradicts the state’s obligation to ensure progressive
realization of the right to health. 287 The aim of applying such fees is to create additional
resources and improve efficiency. 288 However, in reality it undermines the right to health
for the vulnerable groups because it reduces “their use of such services due to prohibitive
costs and through impoverishment by the effects of unavoidable health expenses.” 289

Moreover, borrower governments are pressured by IMF conditionality to cut social
spending to meet fiscal deficit targets, but this result in negative consequences on the
affordability and accessibility of healthcare. 290 This has been illustrated by a study on
West African countries that found that “each additional IMF condition reduces
government health expenditure per capita by 0.25%.”291 In addition, the UN Human
Rights Council reported that the decrease in government spending due to IMF
conditionality in Cyprus, Greece and Ireland resulted in “decrease in healthcare staff,
reductions in the number of hospital beds, and increases in waiting times for medical
procedures.”292 Furthermore, the condition of limiting the public sector wage bill impedes
“a country’s ability to hire, adequately remunerate, or retain healthcare professionals.” 293
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Also, the conditions imposed by the IMF as currency devaluation and privatization of
state owned enterprises could impair the people’s right to health. First, currency
devaluation is advocated by the IMF and the WB to “improve the external
competitiveness of countries.” 294 Yet, currency devaluation “impedes access to imported
medicines and medical equipment by raising the price of imports.”295 Second,
privatization is presented by the IMF as a method to raise funds for governments
suffering from cash shortage.296 But at the same time privatization can result in losing a
reliable public revenue source for the state to fund the health sector. 297 Also, benefits
provided by state-owned enterprises to healthcare coverage of employees could be
withdrawn after privatizations affecting accessibility of healthcare. 298

b. Argument of IFIs Adherence to Human Rights:
A controversial debate exists in the international sphere regarding the adherence of IFIs
to human rights. There is a view that considers IFIs “beyond the reach of international
human rights law,”299 while there is a strong counter argument for this.
(i)

Position of IFIs:

By having a glimpse on history, IFIs have strongly resisted any suggestion to consider
human rights in their operations. They consider themselves as economically focused
organizations and demarcated themselves from institutions concerned with human rights
as the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the United Nations. 300 So, IFIs
“asserted their right to operate in an isolated pocket of international law.” 301 It is worth
mentioning that the Commission on Human Rights invited the WB and the IMF to
participate in the drafting process of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
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Cultural Rights (ICESCR), but they declined the invitation by justifying that human
rights falls outside their mandates defined in their Articles of Agreement. 302

The WB and the IMF refuses to consider human rights based on the ground that there
constituent instruments is limited to economic purposes and prohibited any interference
in the political affairs of its members states. The IMF interpreted its Articles of
Agreement as prohibiting it from considering any political non-economic matters.303
Similarly, the WB claims that article IV, section 10 of the IBRD Articles of Agreement
known as ‘political prohibition’ provides that:

The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member;
nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the
member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant
to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order
to achieve the purposes stated in Article I.304
So the existence of the political prohibition derived from their constitutive instruments
led to the assumption that any issue “need to be labeled ‘political’ or ‘economic’ to
determine whether they are lawfully within the scope of the Bank’s operations.” 305 This
has been even pushed further as an Assistant Director in the IMF’s Office in Europe
highlighted that “human rights advocates should not expect the international financial
institutions (IFIs) to impose human rights-related policy conditions on their member
countries.”306 This was justified on the basis that IFIs lack the expertise required to judge
human rights practices as well as “nothing prevents developing country governments
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under structural adjustment from incorporating human rights into their poverty reduction
agreements.”307

In addition to the political prohibition claimed by IFIs in order not to consider human
rights in their agreements and policies, they have also denied the application of human
rights law on the ground that treaties related to human rights bind only state parties. 308
This has been seconded by an IMF spokesperson before the United Nations SubCommission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, where he declared that
the IMF is not obliged to promote human rights globally due to the lack of mandate to
promote these rights, while stressing “that the IMF is not bound by various human rights
declarations and conventions.” 309 Furthermore, IFIs claimed that they are independent
legal persons distinct from state obligations regarding human rights. 310

(ii)

The Counter-Argument:

There is a counter-argument against the one presented by IFIs to escape legal
responsibility concerning complying with human rights. This counter-argument is
construed on the need that IFIs must not only have obligations to respect basic human
rights, but also refrain from taking any steps that might undermine the borrower country’s
compliance with its national and international human rights obligations. 311

First, the argument invoked by IFIs not to consider human rights based on political
prohibition ground is invalid. The ‘political prohibition’ stated under their constitutive
instruments was drafted at the time of their establishment in 1944 when they had a
specific mandate as a “narrowly focused monetary institution providing foreign exchange
to help member states overcome temporary balance of payments problems.” 312 But today
it is out of question that IFIs have went beyond their mandates and got involved in
307
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significantly shaping the economic, social and domestic policies of their member states 313
under what is currently known as ‘mission creep’. 314 Accordingly, the WB and the IMF
“have evolved significantly from their originally intended purposes and that both now
engage broadly in area that significantly affect human rights.” 315 In addition to the
mission creep debate, the economic reforms proposed by IFIs as privatization, cutting of
government expenditure, and reducing welfare payments can result in restricting the
accessibility of essential services that causes major social consequences as negatively
affecting the realization of economic, social and cultural rights.316 Consequently, “the
untouchable ‘political’ policy area often has economic consequences.” 317 This is because
most human rights-related issues encompass economic and non-economic consequences,
so any human rights issue “could simultaneously constitute an economic consideration as
well as an aspect of a nation’s political affairs or political character.”318 Accordingly, the
political prohibition “does not on any contemporary account entail a prohibition of
human rights consideration,” 319 as factors including social, environmental and political
elements may affect economic growth, thus requiring “proper consideration in the
crafting of policies.”320 Furthermore, the function of the political prohibition in the
Articles of Agreement was to ensure non-discrimination between states, as it was
“intended to ensure that the IBRD used economic criteria in approving loans, rather than
allowing the process to be used for political leverage.”321 It is worth noting that Roberto
Danino, former WB general counsel, highlighted that to the political prohibition matter
should be interpreted in light of the WB objectives stated under article I of its Articles of
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Agreement, as he advocated that there are strong grounds for the WB to consider human
rights as part of its economic decision making process. 322

Second, the argument that IFIs are not signatories to international human rights treaties is
not considered a leeway for IFIs to escape being obliged to consider human rights in its
policies. Although, it is true that IFIs are not signatories to human rights treaties and do
not have the ability to ratify them. 323 However, most principles of international human
rights treaties that revolve around the promotion of the dignity of the human person are
considered customary international law, which could be violated by states and non-state
actors alike. 324 Despite the controversy of the adherence of non-state actors to customary
international law, but by the minimum standard is that customary norms influence the
interpretation of international instruments, including Articles of Agreement of IFIs. 325
Furthermore, IFIs is composed of member states, which are at least obliged by some
human rights in treaties they are signatories, which are derived from the UN Charter and
customary international law. 326 From these obligations is that a state must refrain from
concluding any agreement that might impede the realization of its human rights
obligations. 327 In this respect, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in
its General Comment on the right to water highlighted that:

322

Adam Mcbeth, supra note 302, at 1109. Also, see, Antonio Morelli, International Financial Institutions
and their Human Rights Silent Agenda: A Forward-Looking View on the “Protect, Respect and Remedy”
Model in Development Finance, American University International Law Review, Vol 36, Issue 1, pp 52-101,
(2021), at 67,
https://aucegypt.summon.serialssolutions.com/#!/search?bookMark=eNqNjs1Og0AUhWeBia36Djd1K8n
M2NbobsJc4Ea4Q4Zpq6vGBS4aAwrliXxRQV_A3ZeT87cUUdu1TSQWaqNlvN7Kl0uxHIaTlEqq7XohvokDejaB
HJsCUmLDCU1EXAcKu1mvwbCFkCN5yHelYfCU5aGGmgrkACZDtuYJDKTOH4y3ceHcM3EGe8IDOJ6zsKq8C5i
EO_BYVxP8tnos0b6uoHQW51GwuMfCVeVc_PcGr8XF9vH0NyI6NyPzZW4TTEkefzZd19jM5yPp27s28lx1ButlH7UD_r-f64fGPtOJA (last visited 21/5/2021).
323
Adam Mcbeth, supra note 302, at 1110.
324
Adam Mcbeth, supra note 302, at 1110.
325
Adam Mcbeth, supra note 302, at 1110-1111. Also see, the section of the (Controversy of Customary
International Law and IOS) under Chapter Three in this paper.
326
Adam Mcbeth, supra note 302, at 1111.
327
Adam Mcbeth, supra note 302, at 1111. For example, the ICESCR obliges under article 12 of the right to
health obliges states to consider the right to health when concluding financial and facility agreement with
IFIs as the WB and the IMF, to ensure the realization of the right to health and that nothing impedes such
realization.

50

States parties should ensure that their actions as members of international
organizations take due account of the right to water. Accordingly, States parties
that are members of international financial institutions, notably the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and regional development banks, should take
steps to ensure that the right to water is taken into account in their lending
policies, credit agreements and other international measures. 328
In spite that IFIs are non-state actors, but they are composed of member states and have
an independent legal personality. 329 This personality entails them to have rights and
obligations under international law. 330 Also, their Articles of Agreement are interpreted
from the lens of international law like customary international law and the UN Charter. 331
So, if the acts of the IFIs are regarded as collective action of their member states, then
states can neither escape their obligation to abide by customary international law nor its
commitments derived from the UN Charter.332 Derived from this approach IFIs should
consider human rights, so that their member states won’t be in violation of their
international legal obligations.333 Moreover, article 35 of Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International
Organizations (VCLTIO) stated that
An obligation arises for a third State or a third organization from a provision of a
treaty if the parties to the treaty intend the provision to be the means of
establishing the obligation and the third State or the third organization expressly
accepts that obligation in writing. Acceptance by the third organization of such an
obligation shall be governed by the rules of that organization. 334
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It could be argued that the IMF is neither a signatory to the ICESCR nor did the IMF
provide an express consent as specified under article 35.335 However, the IMF is bound
by the UN Charter which encompasses economic, social and cultural rights. 336 The UN
Charter enjoys hierarchical superiority so it controls the agreements concluded between
the IMF and the borrowing country. 337 Consequently, the IMF is indirectly bound by the
ICESCR.338

In addition, the WB and the IMF concluded relationship agreement with the United
Nations by which they are recognized as United Nations specialized agencies, so they are
into a relationship with the central bodies of the UN.339 It is worth highlighting that such
relationship agreement obliges the specialized agency “to assist in achieving the
objectives of international economic and social cooperation” 340 as defined in article 55 of
the UN Charter, where “universal respect and observance of human rights”341 are from
the major goals of the mentioned article. Also, the “Charter identifies the promotion and
encouragement of respect for human rights as one of the principal purposed of the
UN.”342 Thus, IFIs are obliged to contribute to and observe the universal respect of
human rights.343

So, derived from the fact that IMF is a specialized agency of the UN and that the two
main goals of the UN is to protect world peace and protect human rights. 344 The IMF
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should not undertake activities that undermine the parent’s organizations’ goals. 345 Also,
based on the fact that respect for some human rights is a necessary precondition for
economic development, so if the IMF undermines human rights then it undermines
promotion of economic development.346

3. Legal Framework for the Establishment of the IMF Responsibility:
a. ILC and ILA Articles:
The legal basis for the responsibility of the IMF as an international organization is
detailed in the International Law Commission (ILC) draft articles on the responsibility of
international organizations (DARIO), which has been adopted by the ILC in 2011. Article
(3) of the DARIO stipulated that “every international wrongful act of an international
organization entails the international responsibility of that organization.”347 Moreover,
article (4) of the DARIO mentioned the elements that formulate the internationally
wrongful act committed by the IO where it stated that
There is an internationally wrongful act of an international organization when a
conduct consisting of act or omission (a) is attributable to that organization under
international law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of that
organization.348
Accordingly, the responsibility of an IO arise when these two elements are fulfilled; a
breach of an international obligation and when this conduct is attributable to the IO. First,
it is worth mentioning that the commentary of the DARIO clarified that the international
responsibility of an IO arises when there is a breach of an obligation under international
law, even if this conduct is not prohibited by international law. 349 As the commentary
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provided an example stating that responsibility is established if “an international
organization fails to comply with an obligation to take preventive measures in relation to
an activity that is not prohibited.” 350 This explains the use of the term “conduct” to cover
both, acts and omissions. Also, article (10) clarified that a breach of an international
obligation by an IO exists
When an act of an international organization is not in conformity with what is
required of it by that obligation, regardless of the origin or character of the
obligation concerned.351
The formulation of the term “regardless of its origin” implies that the primary source of
an international obligation could be based on any source of international law, like
international treaties or customary international law. 352 Second, articles (6) and (7) of the
DARIO discussed the attribution of conduct to the IO. Article (6) considered the conduct
attributed to the IO when performed by an organ or agents of an IO, while article (7)
discussed the attribution of conduct to the IO, if performed by organ of a state or organs
or agents of an IO placed at the disposal of another IO.353 The commentary of the DARIO
highlighted an important aspect where it mentioned that there might be dual or even
multiple attribution of conduct. As it specifically stated that
Attribution of a certain conduct to an international organization does not imply
that the same conduct cannot be attributed to a State, nor does attribution of
conduct to a State rule out attribution of the same conduct to an international
organization. One could also envisage conduct being simultaneously attributed to
two or more international organizations, for instance when they establish a joint
organ and act through that organ.354
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In addition to the ILC DARIO, the International Law Association, in May 1996,
established a Committee on the Accountability of International Organizations, which has
issued a report in this regard in its 68th Conference held in Taipei in 1998.355 This
Committee mentioned that the relation between an IO and its members is governed by the
international agreement establishing the organization and general principles of
international law. 356 The Committee has also considered “accountability of and towards
international organizations as comprising three interrelated and mutually supportive
components;”357 which are the following
-

the extent to which international organisations, in the fulfillment of their
responsibilities as established in their constituent instruments, are and should
be subject to or exercising forms of internal and external scrutiny and
monitoring, irrespective of potential and subsequent liability and/or
responsibility;

-

tortious liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts or omissions
not involving a breach of any rule or norm of international and/or
institutional law; ( e.g. environmental damage as a result of lawful nuclear
or space activities)

-

responsibility arising out of acts or omissions which do constitute a
breach of a rule or norm of international and/or institutional law (e.g.
violations of human rights or humanitarian law, breach of contract, gross
negligence, or as far as institutional law is concerned acts of organs ultra
vires or violating the law of employment relations). 358

The Committee has further elaborated that these three levels of accountability could be
distinguished based on three principles. The principle of good governance applies to the
first level, the precautionary principle governs the second level, while legal
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responsibilities under domestic, regional and/or international law relates to the third level
of accountability. 359
In a similar vein, the ILA held another conference in Berlin in 2004 discussing the
accountability of IOS from the perspective of providing the recommended rules and
practices (RRP) “based upon principles, objectives and concepts that are common to all
IOS.”360 The RRP encompass several principles like principle of good governance,
procedural regularity, principle of objectivity and impartiality, principle of supervision
and control and last but not least principle of due diligence. 361 The Committee has
enumerated three main points concerning the principle of due diligence, which are
1. Member States as members of an organ of an IO, and organs and agents of
an IO have a fundamental obligation to ensure the lawfulness of actions and
decisions.
2. All organs and agents of an IO, in whatever official capacity they act, must
comport themselves so as to avoid claims against the IO.
3. Members of an IO have a duty to exercise adequate supervision of the IO, i.e.
to ensure that it is operating in a responsible manner so as to protect not only
their own interests but also that of third parties. 362
Furthermore, the Committee has shed the light on a crucial aspect which is that
operational activities of an IO might be lawful under their constituent instruments while
causing significant harm to third parties. 363 In this regard, the Committee has provided
certain practices that IOS should follow as “preventive of damage caused by lawful
operational activities.”364 These practices include
1.Prior to engaging in operational activities, IO-s should assess the potential
damage which these activities may cause. This assessment should be kept under
review as the activity proceeds.
2. IO-s should take appropriate precautionary measures to prevent the occurrence
of unnecessary damage caused by their operational activities or at any event
to minimise the risk thereof.
3. IO-s should co-operate in good faith and, as necessary, seek the assistance
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of other IO-s or States in preventing unnecessary damage or at any event in
minimising the risk thereof.365
The Committee has even demonstrated that a conduct of an IO might be inconformity
with the constituent instrument of the organization, but still “this does not prevent them
from being wrongful under international law because of their non-conformity with other
applicable rules of international law.” 366 An essential example was provided in this
regard
IO-s may incur international legal responsibility if their use of force and their
imposition of economic coercive measures are not in conformity with relevant
rules of international law, and in particular the humanitarian law principles of
proportionality and of necessity. 367

After laying out the articles regulating the accountability of IOS adopted by the ILC and
the ILA, the question that arises is what are the obligations related to human rights
incumbent upon IOS, specifically IFIs when providing loans or assistance to the
borrowing country?
b. Obligations of IFIs:
In the General Comment No.12 of the CESCR related to the right to adequate food under
article 11 of the Covenant, the light was shed on the obligations imposed on State parties
in this regard, which are applicable to any other human right: the obligations to respect,
to protect and to fulfil. 368 The obligation to fulfil encompasses the obligation to facilitate
and to provide, which means that State parties must engage in activities that facilitate
access and utilization of resources to achieve food security for people. 369 The obligation
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to respect entails that State parties must refrain from taking any measures that would
result in preventing existing access to adequate food.370 Lastly, the obligation to protect
means that State parties must take measures to “ensure that enterprises or individuals do
not deprive individuals of their access to adequate food.”371
There is a strong relation between these obligations and the structural adjustment
programs provided by IFIs to the borrowing countries. On one hand, the structural
adjustment paradigm “assumes that a country is trying to meet its ICESCR obligation by
borrowing money.”372 On the other hand, “the conditionalities on which the very money
is borrowed go against human rights norms.” 373 Because the IFIs plays two roles which
are solving and creating human rights problems, then “some level of human rights duties
must be shared by the IFI.”374 Although, States are obliged to respect, to protect and to
fulfill human rights, the IFIs are only obliged to respect human rights. 375 This is justifies
by two reasons. First, if the structural adjustment paradigm respect human rights and
provide the required resources, then they will help the borrowing State to protect and to
fulfil. 376 Second, human rights are not explicitly stated under the constituent instruments
of IFIs and the “promotion of human rights will require a much more active human rights
policy operation than the institution have been set up to handle.” 377
Moreover, article (22) of the ICESCR stated that
The Economic and Social Council may bring to the attention of other organs of
the United Nations, their subsidiary organs and specialized agencies concerned
with furnishing technical assistance any matters arising out of the reports referred
to in this part of the present Covenant which may assist such bodies in deciding,
each within its field of competence, on the advisability of international measures
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likely to contribute to the effective progressive implementation of the present
Covenant.378
The CESCR General Comment No.2 on the international technical assistance measures
has clarified that the “specialized agencies” mentioned in article (22) includes the World
Bank and the IMF. 379 The Committee has observed the “necessary evil of the outside
assistance,”380 where there is a negative impact on the ESCR due to the debt burden and
adjustment programs which involve austerity measures, noting that these programs are
unavoidable. Consequently, the Committee has urged States parties and UN agencies to
protect ESCR by making

Particular effort to ensure that such protection is, to the maximum extent possible,
built-in programmes and policies designed to promote adjustment. Such an
approach, which is sometimes referred to as “adjustment with a human face” or as
promoting “the human dimension of development” requires that the goal of
protecting the rights of the poor and vulnerable should become a basic objective
of economic adjustment. Similarly, international measures to deal with the debt
crisis should take full account of the need to protect economic, social and cultural
rights through, inter alia, international cooperation. In many situations, this might
point to the need for major debt relief initiatives.381
c. Attribution of Conduct:
The ILC DARIO has provided the legal framework for the responsibility of IOS, where
one of the elements to hold the IO responsible was that the conduct must be attributed to
the IO. Article (6) and article (7), respectively; stated that
The conduct of an organ or agent of an international organization in the
performance of functions of that organ or agent shall be considered an act of that
organization under international law.382
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The conduct of an organ of a State or an organ or agent of an international
organization that is placed at the disposal of another international organization
shall be considered under international law an act of the latter organization if the
organization exercises effective control over that conduct.383
Despite the clarity of the text, there are no specific criteria to be followed in practice to
link the effects in the borrower country to the austerity measures imposed in the form of
conditionality in IMF loans. As the IMF’s argument would be that the State has its own
sovereignty and it applied the conditions in its own territory by its will. Despite this
dilemma, there are ways that could establish this causal link. First, there are international
legal precedents like the Independent Evaluation Office report issued by the IMF
regarding the relation between Argentina’s economic crisis and the IMF structural
programs. Second, the view of scholars to the attribution of austerity measures to the
IMF. Third, the international adhesion contract concluded between the IMF and the
borrowing country.

First, the case of Argentina could be taken as a legal precedent on the international scale
regarding the effects of the conditionality on the economic situation in Argentina and
consequently on the people’s human rights which are adversely affected by the recession
of the economy. Briefly, Argentina had faced a series of events from 1991 till 2001,
during that period it was engaged in several loans from the IMF. These loans were two
Extended Fund Facility (EFFs) in 1992 and 1998, as well as two Standby Arrangements
(SBAs) in 1996 and 2000.384 In April 1991, the IMF introduced the “Convertibility
Plan”, which was “designed to stabilize the economy through drastic, and almost
irreversible, measures.”385 The plan was to fix the peso at par with the US Dollar.386
Under the Convertibility Plan, “Argentina saw a marked improvement in its economic
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performance,”387 where stabilization was reached and the “economy grew at an average
rate of 6 percent per year through 1997.”388 However, in 1998 the economic growth
started to slow down,389 and the country faced a severe and prolonged recession. 390 In
2000, “Argentina began to experience severely diminished access to capital markets,” 391
along with “grave concerns about the country’s exchange rate and debt sustainability.”392
So there were negotiations between Argentina and the IMF to receive further assistance
from the IMF, upon which Argentina submitted a Letter of Intent (LOI) and
Memorandum of Economic Policies (MEP) having its main theme revolving around
fiscal austerity measures. 393 However, in 2001 Argentina had still been facing economic
problems where it suffered from political instability and complete loss of market
access.394 The country’s debt has reached US $132 Billion, in one day in 2001 US $ 1.3
Billion fled Argentine Banks, in 2002 unemployment increased 25 percent, industrial
output decreased 15 percent, prices of a “basic basket” groceries increased 50 percent, all
of this led to that 50 percent of the population lives in poverty. 395 In the end of 2001, the
IMF decided to suspend disbursements to Argentina due to noncompliance with the IMF
conditionality accompanying the IMF program. 396 However, there were concerns raised
by some observers about the “effectiveness and quality of financing and policy advice
provided by the IMF.”397 So the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) started to explore
this matter. The IEO divided its examination into two distinct phases. The first phase is
the pre-crisis from 1991-2000, where they examined these issues: the Convertibility
Regime, the fiscal policy, external debt inflows, structural reform, institutional and
political factors, vulnerabilities in the banking system, official financing, regional and
387
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global factors and lastly transparency and data dissemination. 398 The second phase is the
crisis and its immediate aftermath, 2000-2002, where they explored the December 2000
decision to provide exceptional access, the program review in May 2001, the September
2001 decision to augment the package and the December 2001 decision to withhold
further disbursements.399 The IEO examined all of this and issued an evaluation report
comprised of more than a hundred pages, where it stated ten lessons to be “learned and
incorporated into revised policies and procedures.”400 These lessons are related to
“surveillance and program design, crisis management, and the decision-making
process.”401 Moreover, the evaluation report has offered six sets of recommendation
derived from the lessons learned “to improve the effectiveness of IMF policies and
procedures, in the areas of crisis management, surveillance, program relationship, and the
decision-making process.”402

Not only have the Argentine people been suffering from deteriorating economic
conditions, but also their ESC rights have been negatively affected as the country has
been unable to fulfill its international obligations in this regard due to lack of resources.
So the question that arises, is the IMF responsible? The simple answer, by applying the
elements of responsibility stipulated in ILC DARIO, would be that the element of
violation is satisfied as the IMF violated the principle of due diligence and precautionary
principle and the element of attribution could be satisfied if we considered the evaluation
report as the material form for the attribution of conduct. Despite all of this, “the IMF has
publicly denied all the responsibility for the Argentine crisis.” 403 Furthermore, the
evaluation report just examined the problem, its causes and suggested lessons and
recommendations to be taken into consideration by the IMF in further policies. Yet, no
one suffered except the Argentine people whom their rights have been violated without
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providing them any compensation or remedy. It is worth mentioning that there are several
other cases similar to the Argentine case, even if not as severe as Argentina, with no
evaluation reports, so how could attribution of conduct be established? This drives us to
the second way.

Second, the bargaining power of the IMF when concluding a contract with the borrower
country plays an imperative role in favor of the IMF. Taking Argentina as an example,
the sequence of the bargaining power goes as follows:
(1) Argentina attempts to meet the obligations it has to its citizens under the
ICESCR.
(2) To do that, the government needs two things, policies and money.
(3) The Argentine government attempts to choose policies consistent with the
Covenant and borrow the money from the IME
(4) The IMF refuses to loan the money unless Argentina adopts the IMF's policies
over its own. Such policies, including the zero-deficit law, cuts to social security,
and provincial cuts are inconsistent with Argentina's obligations under the
ICESCR.
(5) The IMF has superior bargaining power, being the LLR.
(6) Because of this superior bargaining power of the IMF, Argentina is forced to
accept the terms that violate the ICESCR.404
So a scholar presented a sequence that could be followed to link the violation of the ESC
rights of the Argentine people to the conduct of the IMF. He stated that if Argentina had
not attempted or taken the initiative to apply policies consistent with the ESC rights and
“thus step three never actually occurred the causal link to the IMF would be lost.” 405 The
scholar based this criterion on the fact that several Argentine governments attempted to
implement policies consistent with the ICESCR while negotiating with the IMF. The
attempted policies included for example, supporting local industries by supporting
freedom of economic discrimination, where foreign investors enjoyed a lot of advantages
that can harm local ones. Also, price control policies, wage increase, and increase
expenditure for housing.406 For example, the IMF refused to lend Argentine during Isabel
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Peron’s government in 1974, as the government supported wage increase and had
policies regarding social spending.407 Accordingly, we could consider this a legal
precedent and apply this criterion to other borrower countries by analogy to the Argentine
case. For example, the IMF refused to lend Egypt during Nasser’s era, 408 as President
Nasser’s government wanted the loan to build the High Dam, but the conditionality
accompanying the loan included austerity measures that Nasser refused to abide by at that
time, so the IMF refused to lend Egypt. Moreover, during President Sadat’s era when the
government was negotiating with the IMF to take a loan to pay its external debt, the IMF
required the implementation of austerity measures. For example, to increase the prices of
basic goods as bread, sugar, rice and gas. This resulted in huge demonstrations by
civilians and the government had to draw back the price increase policies. So when Egypt
applied for the EFF in November 2016, taking into consideration the IMF’s history with
Egypt, the government had to accept the austerity measures required to be implemented
in the form of the loan conditionality. These leads to the third way for the attribution of
conduct to the IMF, which is examining the type of contract concluded between the IMF
and the borrower country.

Third, the type of contract concluded between the IMF and the borrower country is
considered an international adhesion contract.409 This is because the IMF has an absolute
high bargaining power and is considered a lender of last resort (LLR). 410 The problem is
that when the borrower country resorts to the IMF, its economic condition is in a very
deteriorating condition, where outside assistance is the only option to improve its
condition and the IMF is almost the only institution that would have enough money to
lend the borrower country.411 So the need of the country for money is accompanied by
lack of free consent to the conditionality of the structural adjustment program provided
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by the IMF.412 From a theoretical point of view, all states are equal and stand on an equal
footing from the IMF, but in reality there is a strong relationship between the influence of
the IMF and the identity of the borrower country, as the IMF has great influence over
policies of poor countries than over rich ones. 413 If the borrower country enjoys a healthy
economy or is rich to the extent that it does not need the IMF resources, then this country
is free to accept or reject the IMF perspectives. 414 Meanwhile, poor countries or ones that
are already using or expecting to use IMF resources cannot treat IMF’s views
dispassionately. 415 Consequently, countries with low bargaining power are forced to
accept the “terms offered by the IMF, regardless of their consistency with ESC rights,
because they have no other source of equivalent fund.” 416 This creates the dilemma of the
attribution of conduct to the IMF, as usually States have the primary responsibility to
protect human rights of their citizens against any abuses, but the structural adjustment
programs create a different scenario where it would be “unjust and ineffective to hold the
State solely responsible because of its unequal bargaining power in relation to IFIs.” 417
Although IFIs are not obliged to play a leading role in protecting victims of human rights,
however; they are obliged to “ensure that their operations do not exacerbate problematic
human rights situations.”418 It is worth mentioning that the Argentine delegate when was
asked about the rights of the Argentine people before the ESCR Committee in 1999 he
mentioned that

[My] Government, like so many others, was trying to adapt to the current global
situation and open up the country's economy, which it could not do without loans.
The international financial institutions, such as the IMF, imposed certain
conditions on the country when loans were being negotiated, especially in the
fields of employment and social security. It would therefore be helpful if the
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Committee would share its criticisms, suggestions and concerns not only with
delegations, but with institutions like the IMF as well. 419

Not only is the attribution of conduct a debatable issue regarding IOS, but also the debate
extends to member states in the IOS. The Board of Directors and the Board of Governors
are vested great powers in the IMF, where they enjoy full-decision making powers.420The
Board of Directors or the Board of Governors are considered representatives of their own
States, so they are obliged to adhere to “their international human rights obligations in the
policies they pursue that impact on the exercise of those rights in recipient countries.” 421
The vote of the State representative is considered a state act, which is governed by human
rights law and general law on state responsibility. 422
There is an argument that decisions taken by the organs of the IO “can be attributed to
the organization but not to the states that participated in the organs.” 423 However, the
counter-argument is based on two matters. First, there must be a distinction between act
of the state and act of the IO.424 The Centre for International Environmental Law
demonstrated that the issue is the responsibility of the state for its own act, not the
attribution of the IO’s act to the state.425 Second, the assumption that the international
personality of the IO excludes state responsibility creates a “legal limbo, one where states
control the international organization but are immune from legal responsibility for the
consequences of such control.”426 Member states are an additional layer in the legal
scenario of IOS, as they lie behind the legal shell of the IO. 427 There must a separation
between the institutional legal order of the organization and general international law,

419

Jason Morgan-Foster, supra note 335, at 618.
Margot E. Salomon, supra note 118, at 536.
421
Margot E. Salomon, supra note 118, at 536.
422
Margot E. Salomon, supra note 118, at 536.
423
Margot E. Salomon, supra note 118, at 536.
424
Margot E. Salomon, supra note 118, at 536.
425
Margot E. Salomon, supra note 118, at 536.
426
Margot E. Salomon, supra note 118, at 536.
427
Catherine Brolmann, Member States and International Legal Responsibility, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
LAW REVIEW, VOLUME 12, ISSUE 2, PP 358–381, (July 2015), at 359,
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=poh&AN=115557573&site=ehost-live (last
visited 20/07/2021).
420

66

since IOS are attributed a separate legal identity, where the metaphor “institutional veil”
is used. 428 The institutional veil helps to view the “position of member states as well as
their relation “with the organization from the outside perspective of general international
law, rather than from within the institutional order of the organization.” 429 Accordingly,
there could be joint responsibility between the member state and the IO. On one hand,
responsibility of the state is to recognize “the acts of its organs, such as an executive
director that votes to approve a project.”430 On the other hand, the responsibility of the IO
is “for the acts of its organs, as the board of directors that approves a project.”431 It is
worth noting that the example is referring to the voting powers of the Board of Governors
and Board of Directors due to the huge power vested in them, especially with the
weighed voting system in the IMF. An example that shows that the weighed voting
systems plays an imperative role in the IMF is the loan that was approved by the IMF in
November 1982 to be given to South Africa amounting $1.1 billion. 432 This decision was
remarkable as the UN General Assembly opposed this loan “by a vote of 121 to 3 just
two weeks earlier,”433 because the international community was against apartheid. 434 But
the US, the UK and West Germany supported the loan, where they “collectively owned
over 30 percent of the voting power at the IMF.” 435 Surprisingly, “a coalition of Western
countries with 51.6 percent of the votes at the IMF pushed the loan through.”436 So, the
votes constituting a minority in the General Assembly became a majority in the IMF. 437
The ILC DARIO have also referred to this matter in article 61 which states that
A State member of an international organization incurs international
responsibility if, by taking advantage of the fact that the organization has
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competence in relation to the subject-matter of one of the State’s international
obligations, it circumvents that obligation by causing the organization to commit
an act that, if committed by the State, would have constituted a breach of the
obligation.438
Accordingly, the argument that a member state should not bear international
responsibility when it aids an IO when it acts according to the rules of the IO, does not
mean that the “state is free to ignore its other international obligations, for example in the
area of human rights.”439 Moreover, the member state “would incur responsibility for a
breach of those obligations as part of the law on state responsibility.”440 The obligations
incurred upon the member states extended even further to oblige the member state to
refrain to make decisions within the IO that are contrary to human rights obligations, at
least to which the member states with majority voting rights have subscribed to. 441

In conclusion, there is a complicated dilemma for the accountability of IFIs. Their
extended mandates known as ‘mission creep’ resulted in extending their policies to
millions of private individuals, who may suffer from the negative consequences of these
policies and face the issue of the lack of any resort for remedy. So, IOS as the IMF where
it impacts the exercise of human rights should “have their relevant human rights duties
clearly spelled out.”442 The lack of effective internal mechanism for legal remedies along
with the unclear standing from the well-established principle of the right to remedy under
customary international law and non-adherence to human rights help these institutions to
flee accountability. It must be taken into account that “a host of factors including social,
environmental and political elements that may affect economic growth and thus require
proper consideration in the crafting of policies.” 443 The intervention of the IFIs in the
socio-economic rights and political rights of private individuals in developing countries
has left the harmed individuals to one resort which is directing claims against the
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borrower government, as the duty bearers under human rights treaties. 444 Meanwhile, IFIs
“wearing their ‘non-state’ actor hats, have been able to claim that they possess no legal
obligations in the area of human rights.445 This drives us to search for remedies within the
domestic law for private individuals.

444
445

Margot E. Salomon, supra note 118, at 531.
Margot E. Salomon, supra note 118, at 531.

69

IV.

Available Remedies within Domestic Law

From an international perspective, private individuals who suffer from negative effects of
IMF decisions, have no resort to hold it, as an IO, liable for its actions, hence this creates
the need to focus on the available remedies for private individuals within the domestic
law in Egypt. The controversial question in this regard is how private individuals can
challenge the negative consequences they suffer from the IMF decisions within the
Egyptian domestic law. In this regard, the Extended Fund Facility ‘EFF’ given to Egypt
from the IMF in 2016 will be taken as example. On one hand, examining the EFF
conditionality and objectives as well as its effects on the economy and private individuals
will provide a clear understanding of how IMF decisions could have a huge impact on the
borrowing country. The light will be shed in particularly on the effect of the EFF on the
right to health stipulated under article (12) of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights. On the other hand, the search for remedies will be via
focusing on the Egyptian civil society activities and the Egyptian judiciary, specifically
the State Council and the Supreme Constitutional Court.
A.

Egypt’s EFF from the IMF in 2016:

Egypt was and is still a developing country, but the political unrest Egypt has faced in
2011 resulted in various negative consequences on the economy, which even worsened
its developmental level. There has been instability in the country’s authorities; executive,
legislative and judicial which caused sort of chaos in the country’s security level. This
created a repelling environment for foreign investment, impeded the development of
domestic investment and “foreign exchange shortages and the overvalued currency
hampered the manufacturing sector.”446 Moreover, the tourism sector has suffered from
huge losses. Accompanied by weak revenues, macroeconomic vulnerabilities and slow
growth rate, Egypt was in need for an effective reform policy, which in the view of the
Egyptian authorities had to be supported by a fund from the IMF. On August 11, 2016
and upon the request of the Egyptian authorities there has been a mission sent by the IMF
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to Egypt to explore the economic reform policy and to discuss the financial assistance
that shall be provided by the IMF in this regard.447 On November 11, 2016 the Executive
Board of the IMF approved granting Egypt an EFF on a tenor of three years amounting
$US 12 billion, which ended in July, 2019.
1.

Objectives and Conditionality of the EFF:

This EFF is like a two sided coin, one side states the IMF objectives for granting it and
the other side enumerates the conditions. The main objectives of the fund include, first:
exchange rate, monetary and financial sector policy where the CBE liberalized the
foreign exchange system to increase international reserve which had declined after 2011,
attract investment and promote competition. 448 Second, fiscal policy, social protection and
public financial management concerned with increasing tax revenues and decreasing
expenditure.449 Third, structural reforms and inclusive growth directed to increase job
opportunities for women and youth. 450 So, the EFF aimed to “help Egypt restore
macroeconomic stability and promote inclusive growth,”451 via decreasing public debt and
budget deficit, creating competitive environment and increasing job opportunities.
Although, the elements of the EFF appear to improve the macroeconomic imbalances
Egypt has been suffering from, its conditionality presents the manipulative role of the
IMF. There were four central conditions that took place and caused several consequences
with long lasting effect on the Egyptian economy and people. These conditions were the
devaluation of the Egyptian pound, introducing value-added tax (VAT), reduction of
energy subsidies and optimization and containing the public sector wage bill. They were
referred to as “key policy measures” 452 aiming to reduce fiscal deficit, decline public debt,
restore confidence in the economy and eliminate foreign exchange shortages. 453 On July
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24 2019, the executive board of the IMF completed its fifth and final review on Egypt’s
economic reform program and approved the disbursement of the last fund installment
amounting $US 2 billion.454 Mr. David Lipton, the Managing Director and Chairman of
the Board of the IMF have said “Egypt has successfully completed the three-year
arrangement under the EFF and achieved its main objectives. The macroeconomic
situation has improved markedly since 2016.”455 He also added that “critical
macroeconomic reforms have been successful in correcting large external and domestic
imbalances, achieving macroeconomic stabilization and a recovery in growth and
employment, and putting public debt on a clearly declining trajectory.” 456
2.

Brief on the Economic Consequences of the EFF in Egypt:

Although the concluding comments of the IMF after the fund has ended gives a
promising impression that the economic situation has improved, but the EFF conditions
resulted in devastating effects on the economy. The external public debt has dramatically
increased to US $106220.80 million in the third quarter of the FY 2018/2019
accompanied by debt service during this period amounting US $3045 million, compared
to external public debt amounting US $46067.1 million in 2014. 457 Prices of goods and
services have faced unprecedented increase; meanwhile the salaries and pensions
remained the same. A WB report issued in April, 2019 stated “inflation still exceeds 12
percent and might face further upward pressure as energy subsidies continue to be phased
out.”458 The Egyptian market is still not a favorable environment for investment which is
one of the direct causes for “the double-digit youth unemployment, declining labor force
participation rates, and high level of informal employment.” 459 Another WB report
published in April 30, 2019 mentioned that “some 60 percent of Egypt’s population is
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either poor or vulnerable.”460 Furthermore, the cutting of expenditure and decreasing in
government subsidies affected the allocation of resources for health and education. This
was highlighted by the WB report which stated “debt servicing is expected to remain a
burden on the budget, therefore hindering larger social spending, notably on health and
education,”461 and further stipulated that “socio-economic hardship is exacerbated by poor
public services, which suffer from low budget allocations.”462 The Egyptian Finance
Minister Mohamed Maait has recently said that “The programme has been very harsh.
The heroes are the Egyptian people who have paid the price for the very difficult reforms
and wanted to see the country change,”463 while he was referring to the EFF granted in
2016. This drives us to the rights of the Egyptian people which have been hindered by the
declining economic situation, for example the rights stated under the ICESCR as right to
education, right to health, right to live an adequate life, right to live in dignity and many
others. However, the scope of this paper is limited to the right to health of the Egyptian
people. The matter of health plays a pivotal role to all human beings regardless of age,
gender, nationality, social or financial standard. Its importance is derived from the fact
that it is a fundamental right that enables a person to exercise various other rights. 464
3.

Right to Health under Article (12) of the International Covenant on

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
Although the right to health was mentioned in several international instruments, the most
comprehensive article for this right was stated under article (12) of the ICESCR. This
article was further detailed in general comment number (14) held by the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ‘CESCR’ in 2000 titled the ‘Substantive Issues
arising in the Implementation of the ICESCR’ regarding article (12). As mentioned
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earlier, right to health is a fundamental human right that is essential for the exercise of
other human rights, that justifies the great attention given to this right on the domestic
and the international levels. The CESCR stipulated that article 12.1 mentions that every
individual has the right to enjoy the “highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health”, while article 12.2 mentions the steps that States parties must take to fully realize
this right, noting that the article shed the light on mental health, which is usually ignored.
Article (12) had not only specified the right to health, but also extended to include the
socio-economic factors related to health and the underlying determinants of health as
“food and nutrition, housing, access to safe and potable water, adequate sanitation, safe
and healthy working conditions and a healthy environment.”465 It is worth mentioning
that the CESCR emphasized that the right to health is not an equivalent for the right to be
healthy. For example, states are not responsible for genetic factors or an individual’s
unhealthy lifestyle that would make him/her susceptible to ill health or diseases. So, the
right to health revolves around freedoms; that a person has the right to control one’s
health and body and being free from interference as well as entitlements; which includes
a system of health protection to enjoy the highest attainable standard of health based on
the principle of equal opportunity.466 Furthermore, the CESCR in its comment number 14
specifically enumerated the elements of the right to health, its specific legal obligations
and its core minimum obligations.
First, right to health is composed of four elements, namely; availability, accessibility,
acceptability and quality. Availability means that a State party must ensure that healthcare facilities, goods, services, programs and the underlying determinants of health are
available in sufficient quantity. However, this element varies upon the developmental
level of the State.467 Accessibility implies that everyone must have access to the health
care without discrimination. There are four interrelated aspects in this regard; nondiscrimination, physical accessibility, economic accessibility and information
accessibility. They all revolve around the idea that health facilities, goods, services and
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the underlying determinants of health are within the safe physical reach of everyone
without discrimination including vulnerable and marginalized groups as ethnic
minorities, indigenous people, women, children, adolescents, older persons, disabled and
persons with HIV/AIDS as well as being affordable whether the individual resorted to
public or private health sector, based on the principle of equity, without burdening the
poor households with health expenses if compared to the rich ones. 468 Also, gives
individuals the right to seek, receive and impart information related to health, without
affecting the principle of confidentiality. The third element is acceptability where the
State must ensure that health facilities, goods and services are based on medical ethics
and culturally appropriate.469 The fourth element is quality which states that health
facilities, goods and services are scientifically and medically appropriate, which includes;
skilled medical personnel, scientifically approved and valid drugs, hospital equipment,
safe and potable water and adequate sanitation. 470
Second, the States parties are obliged to respect, protect and fulfil the right to health. The
obligation to respect demonstrates that States must refrain from denying equal access to
everyone, abstain from any discrimination whether in State policy or practices related to
women’s health, refrain from marketing unsafe drugs or applying coercive medical
treatment unless on exceptional basis like control of communicable diseases, refrain from
limiting access to contraceptives or misrepresent health-related information like sexual
education, refrain from unlawfully polluting air, water and soil and finally to refrain from
limiting access to health care as a punitive measure. 471 Furthermore, State parties are
obliged to protect the right to health from third party interference, like the duty to adopt
legislation to ensure equal access of the services provided by third parties, for example
ensure that privatization of the health sector does not affect the elements of the right to
health. 472 Also, States must protect individuals from harmful social and traditional
practices that affect pre- and post- natal care and family planning and marginalized
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groups. This obligation extended further to include that States must carefully consider the
right to health when concluding international agreements or when States are members of
international financial institutions as the IMF and WB, by which the agreements wouldn’t
negatively impact the right to health. 473 The obligation to fulfil is the acts of commission
that a State party must do to fulfil the right to health by facilitating, providing and
promoting this right. In other words, it requires States to “to adopt appropriate
administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional and other measures to fully realize the
right to health.”474 For example, by recognizing the right to health by adopting a national
health policy, ensuring provision of health care, providing sexual and reproductive health
services, training of doctors, sufficient number of hospitals, provision of health insurance
system whether public, private or mixed, promoting medical research and health
education and adopting measures against environmental and occupational health issues. 475
Third, States parties must implement and prioritize the core minimum obligation to
realize the right to health. These are enumerated by the CESCR, which are; accessibility
with no discrimination, especially vulnerable groups, accessibility to food with adequate
nutrition, accessibility to basic shelter, housing, water and sanitation, providing essential
drugs and adopting a national public health strategy. 476 It also includes ensuring
reproductive, maternal and child health care, providing immunization against infectious
diseases, preventing, treating and controlling epidemic and endemic diseases, providing
education and access to information and providing training for health personnel. 477
Finally, it is worth mentioning that article (2) of the ICESCR is closely linked to the right
to health. Article (2.1) mentions that States parties should progressively achieve rights
under the Covenant to the maximum of its available resources by taking steps
individually and via international assistance and cooperation. So, States parties must take
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deliberate, concrete and targeted steps towards the progressive full realization of the right
to health, noting that retrogressive measures are not allowed unless justified by the State.
4.

Negative Impact of the EFF on the Right to Health in Egypt:

The question that arises is how is the poor economic condition that Egypt has suffered
from due to the EFF from the IMF, as previously stated, negatively affected the right to
health of the Egyptian people which they are entitled to by article (12) of the ICESCR?
The answer is that the deteriorating economic condition affected some of the underlying
determinants of health and some of the elements of the right to health; accessibility and
availability. So the EFF hindered Egypt’s economic ability to realize some of the core
minimum obligation required in this regard.
a. Accessibility:
(i)

Transportation Price Increase:

One of the conditions imposed by the IMF in relation to the EFF was cutting energy
subsidies aiming to reduce budget deficit and to protect the budget from sudden changes
in the international oil and gas prices, where the IMF mentioned in a press release in
November, 2016 that “The fuel price increase announced on November 3 were an
important step in that direction.” 478 Yet, these subsidy cuts resulted in a sudden huge
increase in the prices of fuel, water, electricity and public transportation. It’s been stated
that the price on metro tickets in May, 2018 increased by 300%, 479 noting that the Greater
Cairo metro network “is the backbone of mass transportation in the capital with a daily
transportation capacity of over 3.7 million passengers,” 480 and price of gasoline increased
50% in June, 2018.481 Also, prices of taxis increased as “The government-approved taxi
fares have increased four times since the float of the Egyptian pound, most recently in
July 2019 following fuel price increases. The current starting fare of EGP 7 is 280% of
478
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the pre-float fare, with a new rate of EGP 3.6 per subsequent kilometer about 230%
higher than the pre-float rate.”482 This has directly affected people’s access to health care
facilities and services, if two aspects are examined. First, according to Egypt’s
demographic nature, most of the vulnerable and marginalized groups live in governorates
far from Cairo like Upper Egypt where they suffer from high poverty rates,
unemployment, lack of social services, lack of insurance, spread of harmful traditional
practices and less access to education. Second, most of the public hospitals are located in
Cairo and especially the ones that provide good level of health care facilities, goods and
services like the new cancer hospital, if compared to the rest of the governorates. This
means that the increase in the prices of transportation tickets whether metro, train and
taxis affected the accessibility element of the right to health regarding physical and
economic accessibility, where the poor economic conditions of people and marginalized
groups will impede them from travelling to access health facilities. This doesn’t only
affect those living in governorates far from Cairo, but also affects those living in Cairo
but live far from hospitals and require taking more than a single transportation to reach
their medical destination.
(ii)

Medicine and Ambulance Price Increase:

As a consequence of the high inflation rate in Egypt which “stood at 24.3 per cent in
December 2016”483 resulting from the conditions of the EFF, the prices of medicine
accordingly increased. The currency devaluation in November, 2016 has affected the
pharmaceutical industry where “Egypt announced price increases for a number of
products in February 2017, covering 15% of domestically manufactured medicines and
20% of imported medicines.” 484 Furthermore, this increase occurred “after the cost of
production increased by 100 per cent. It had already been raised 20 per cent in May 2016
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and the government’s latest proposal is for an automatic increase every six months.” 485
Moreover, the increase in the import cost affected the access to the subsidized infant
milk.486 This increase affects the economic accessibility for health care goods as
medicines, as the prices became too high for the people to afford buying them, violating
the principle of equity as the increased health expenses disproportionately burdens poor
households if compared to rich ones. This is proved by the existing discrepancy between
rural and urban regarding economic access and quality of health care, especially in Upper
Egypt, as according to the USAID “low-income women are 20% less likely to receive
regular antenatal care than high-income women, while mortality rates for children under
five are 19 deaths per 1000 live births for the wealthiest quintile compared to 42 deaths
for the poorest,”487 which is one the core minimum obligations required to be fully
realized.
Another negative impact is the recent increase in the public ambulance fees. According to
the Egyptian Ambulance Organization board members meeting held on the 24th of
August, 2019 an increase in the fees of ambulance services was approved. Although, the
Organization affirmed that the “transportation of emergency cases, premature babies, and
patients between public hospitals will remain free of charge,” 488 yet the fees for nonemergency transportation between governorates increased to 5 EGP/km and does not
exceed 5,000 EGP, as well as the fees for renting an oxygen tank became 2,700 EGP per
unit and the refill is for 100 EGP.489 Dr. Mohamed Gad, Head of the Egyptian Ambulance
Organization justified this increase in non-emergency services by the fact that the fees list
has not been changed since 2009 and that the consumption price of the ambulance cars
have increased due to the increase in car prices, fuel and car maintenance, so fees
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increase was required to overcome inflation in other factors related to the car. 490
Accordingly, devaluation of the Egyptian pound and cutting in energy subsidies as fuel
adversely affected the economic accessibility of individual to health care services as the
ambulance.
(iii)

Inflation and Poverty:

The combination of the four main conditions of the EFF; introducing VAT, cutting
energy subsidies, devaluation of the Egyptian pound and optimization of the public sector
wage bill, have created a very aggravating economic situation for the middle class and
the poor people. The government introduced a 13% VAT for the FY 2016/2017, which
later rose to 14% for FY 2017/2018.491 This has led to dramatic increase in prices of
goods and services, which “directly affects the cost of living and impacts poorer
households disproportionately.”492 This has led to higher living costs, where the poorest
people suffer the most, as between July 2014 and May 2019, general inflation rose by
more than 100%, meanwhile fruits and vegetable prices rose by more than 203%. 493
Another issue is that cutting subsidies has been implemented before the government had
the technical capacity to adopt any social protection program to protect the poor from the
sudden increase in prices, so “in the absence of an adequate social safety net the living
standards of the millions of Egyptian households already living in poverty are likely to
drop even further, while a huge number of middle class households will be at risk of
falling into poverty.”494 Moreover, the condition of containing the wage bill has even
worsened the situation as according to a WB report “between 2016 and 2018, nominal
wage growth fell below inflation. Official estimates reported that the share of the
population living below the national poverty line in FY18 increased to 32.5 percent, from
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27.8 in 2015, with the highest poverty rates still in rural Upper Egypt.”495 Accordingly,
the increase in prices following the introduction of VAT has accelerated the increase in
inflation rate; meanwhile individuals’ wages remained the same or at least has not been
increased to overcome the inflation. This negatively impacts the economic accessibility to
the right to health, as people’s adequate standard of living has fallen. In addition, it
violated the principle of non-discrimination and equal treatment as the poor, especially
the marginalized ones like in Upper Egypt, are not economically capable of accessing
health facilities, goods and services, if compared to the richer individuals, noting that
they cannot afford private insurance and the public insurance still falls behind the
required levels to cover the whole population. It is worth noting that such embedded
inequalities undermine the right to health of poorer women and girls, as the “financial
barrier continue to limit poorer women’s access to quality prenatal care and basic
healthcare of their children.” 496
b. Availability:
Egypt has a huge population which requires the health care sector to have sufficient
quantity of health facilities, services and goods. It has been stated that “in Egypt the ratio
of hospital beds to people is already low by international standards, and the personnel
compared to the number of beds is lower …Egypt’s physician density at 0.81 physicians
per 1000 people.” 497 Moreover, in the next ten years Egypt demands 6000 doctors across
all governorates each year, while Greater Cairo requires 1100, meanwhile; there is
shortage in the number of nurses due to low payments and lack of social respect for the
job.498 According to CAPMAS statistics, the total number of patients in outpatient clinics
and reception at public and central hospitals in 2016 across all governorates reached
64,781,014, while the total number of doctors, dentists, pharmacists and nurses working
at the Ministry of Health and Population and bodies related to it in 2016 reached
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355,281.499 Another CAPMAS survey stated that “fewer than 1,700 public and private
hospitals served 100 million people, while the number of doctors in Egypt is growing,
access to patients is still a problem, and hospitals need ways to bridge the gap.”500 There
is a disproportionate ratio in number of patients, medical team and hospitals leading to
limited availability of health care to people. Furthermore, the devaluation of the Egyptian
pound accompanied by huge EFF debt service that is paid in dollars, adversely affected
the economic and social rights as the debt servicing ties up resources that could be used
to fulfill the government’s constitutional obligations to progressively realize the right to
health. 501 In the same vein, the correlation between the weak Egyptian pound, increase in
inflation and restrictions upon importation caused shortage in essential items resulting in
“severe crisis in the price and availability of medication, as well as a deterioration in
healthcare services caused by shortages in medical supplies.” 502 This results from the fact
that Egypt depends on import of certain goods that go into the production of local
drugs,503 causing either shortage in medicine or increase in its prices. All of this has
resulted in Egypt’s inability to fully realize the element of availability of the right to
health, in terms of sufficient quantity of hospitals, clinics, trained medical personnel with
competitive salaries and essential drugs. As percentage of health expenditure to state
public expenditure has been on a declining slope from FY 2014/15 till FY 17/18, 504
considered a retrogressive measure without government’s justification.
c. Underlying Determinants of Health:
The underlying determinants of health are on the same importance level as health care
facilities, goods and services. Although, Egypt subsidies certain food items, the
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International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) identified Egypt’s food subsidy
program as a fundamental part of the undernutrition problem as subsidized items like
bread, sugar, edible oil and rice are high in calories but low in nutritional value.505
Furthermore, there has been a dramatic increase in the prices of food and beverage after
the devaluation of the pound and applying the VAT, where the prices were 29.3% higher
in December 2016 than 2015.506 A WB report demonstrated that there has been “food
price shocks”507 due to inflation and energy and utility price increases. This negatively
affected the access to food “for the most marginalized households, with particular
impacts on children.”508
Even the government’s measures to improve the access of the poor to food were of
limited effect as Takaful and Karma program and smart card holders being granted
increased subsidy. Because this didn’t yet cover the inflated prices of essential goods and
a lot of poor, illiterate and undocumented Egyptians weren’t able to apply for smart
cards.509 Another issue is the EFF conditionality of cutting subsidies led to 46.5%
increase in piped water prices;510 which led to a hike in the sewage fees to “75% of the
water price for residential use and 98% for businesses.” 511 In addition, the increase in
electricity prices after subsidy cuts, which rose by 21% for households and 42% for
factories, 512 have logically led to an increase in hospital fees, which highly depend on
electricity for proper functioning of health care services. Consequently, the socioeconomic factors related to the right to health, as food and nutrition as well as access to
safe and potable water and adequate sanitation, which create the environment for people
to live a healthy life, have been negatively impacted by inflation and subsidy cuts.
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To conclude, when the Egyptian authorities resorted to the IMF in 2016 to save the
deteriorating economic condition following the political unrest, they were aiming to pave
the way for economic reform. However, the EFF conditions, being rushed and
cumulative, as cut in public spending and subsidies, pound devaluation, aggressive
introduction of VAT and stagnation of wages led to inflation, high poverty rates, high
import costs and dramatic increase in living costs. Egypt failed to protect the right to
health from third party intervention which is the IMF. As the EFF conditions directly hit
Egypt’s ability to progressively fully realize the right to health as the conditions’ short
comes along with the debt servicing burden has impeded larger social spending on the
health sector and hindered the people’s economic and physical accessibility to good
quality of health care facilities, goods and services due to lack of sufficient quantity,
quality and affordability and violated the principle of non-discrimination as richer
households benefit more from private health care. It is worth noting that the 2014
Constitution provided guarantees for the economic, social and cultural rights but the
austerity measures of the IMF left the country to suffer from staggering levels of
socioeconomic inequality. 513 The IMF “misplaced revenue-raising approach”514 has
reduced the government’s ability to allocate resources for the realization of economic and
social rights, where the burden of cost-cutting was laid on the poorest citizens.515
This has directly affected the realization of the right to health, as the public spending on
health has decreased. Although, the 2014 Constitution requires the allocation of 3% of
the gross national product for the health sector, statistics have marked that the “public
expenditure on health declined between 2015 and 2018 to 1.34%.”516 These conditions
accompanied by low health insurance coverage “threatens the right to health of the most
marginalized Egyptians.”517
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B.

Available Remedies within Egyptian Domestic Law:

After laying out the economic condition in Egypt after applying the conditionality of the
IMF accompanying the EFF of 2016, the question is what are the available domestic
remedies for private individuals who are harmed by this economic condition and
specifically affecting their right to health? The answer to this question lies in examining
the extent of justiciability of this right within the domestic jurisdiction in Egypt. In this
regard, the light should be shed on two spheres. The first sphere is the immunity granted
to IFIs from jurisdiction before domestic courts as well as the framework of the legal
basis of the right to health in Egyptian laws and the procedural requirements for filing a
case. Second, the legal precedents established by the Egyptian judiciary. These
precedents could be viewed from the activity of the Egyptian civil society and decisions
of specific courts, which are the State Council Courts, the Court of Cassation and the
Supreme Constitutional Court. Although, there are no recent published cases regarding
litigation for the consequences of the 2016 EFF conditionality, yet examining the
precedents of the mentioned courts provides a clear understanding of where the judiciary
stands in this matter.
1. Immunity of International Organizations:
International organizations were established in the post-World War II era. Due to the
novelty of these organizations, they were expected “to play new roles in international
affairs and could be vulnerable for pressure from and to interference of their member
states.”518 From this point, the concept of immunity of international organizations
evolved. So it was thought that the most suitable mean to protect these organizations
from any pressure was to provide “them, their officials, their property, and their records
immunity from the jurisdiction of their member states when performing their mandated
functions.”519 It is crucial to observe that the immunity granted to these organizations is
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functional immunity from the jurisdiction of their member states.520 This type of
immunity implies that IOS including IFIs as the WB and the IMF are “legally immune
from proceedings in the domestic courts of their member states,”521 during the course of
their functions stated in their constitutive instruments.
There are several reasons for granting IOS functional immunity. First, is to extend
“international goodwill and comity enjoyed by states to organizations,” 522 which are
formed of states. This is to ease the realization of the objectives of member states in these
organizations. Second, it is “awkward to drag an organization consisting of foreign states
to the courts of one of the states.”523 Third, immunity granted in this context is considered
of functional necessity and its absence may hinder the operations of the organizations. 524
In other words, functional immunity guarantees the independence of these organizations
from the interference of states.525 Fourth, this immunity is to protect the organization
from “perceptions of prejudice and bad faith in national courts,”526 where a member state
could have undue influence over the organization based on its territory. This is a situation
that might not be acceptable by other member states. Also, to protect the organization
from “baseless actions brought from improper motives.”527 In addition, even if it is
accepted that the organization submit to jurisdictions of various courts, this will cause
legal uncertainty as different courts will come up with different rulings due to different
legal systems and traditions leading to a conflict of decisions on the obligations of the
organizations. 528 Consequently, the theory of jurisdictional immunity of IOS is based on
520
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the assumption that the organization cannot operate in the common interest of all member
states, if it is controlled by the jurisdiction of a member state.529 The rationale behind this
theory is to reach independence from national governments. 530
International Organizations derive their immunity from their constitutive instruments. For
example, article (IX) (8) (i) of the IMF Articles of Agreement explicitly stated that the
IMF “shall be immune from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their
official capacity except when the Fund waives this immunity.” 531 Similarly, the IBRD of
the WB Group enjoys immunity according to its founding treaty, where Article VII of its
Articles of Agreement stipulated that the “IBRD shall have immunity to enable it to
fulfill its functions.”532 It is noticed that IOS usually accompany the immunity provision
with a waiver exception stated in their constituent document. This is called “constitutive
waiver” which is a waiver that exists based on a provision in the constituent instrument of
an IO to permit suits against the organization in domestic courts.533 However, this waiver
is governed by the provision, which might limit the waiver to specific types of suits and
to specific domestic courts.534 Moreover, a waiver is, by definition, a unilateral act, which
means that only the holder of the right can waive it voluntarily. 535 So it lies within the
absolute discretion of the organization to waive its immunity and submit itself to suits.
The problem that arises is that if the organization did not waive its immunity, this will
surely lead to abuse of immunity and denial of justice. 536
The dilemma of abuse of immunity is governed by article (24) of the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies. This Convention did not define
the abuse of immunity. 537 The article stated that:
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The state and the IO should try and resolve the matter through consultations. If
this does not result in a satisfactory outcome, the question whether the abuse has
occurred shall be submitted for an advisory opinion of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ). If the ICJ finds abuse, the state shall have the right, after
notification, to deny the IO the benefits of the privilege or immunity that has been
abused.538
The core problem with this article is that it did not provide private individuals the right to
directly challenge IFIs through any channel, emanating from the traditional perspective of
public international law that individuals are not subjects to international law. 539 The
article limited its scope to states and IOS to solve disputes via consultation and the ICJ in
case of abuse. 540 It is out of question that states will be reluctant to challenge IFIs on
behalf of their citizens, as this “may jeopardize the granting of loans and grants from the
same institutions.”541
Accordingly, IFIs immunity is limited to functional immunity not an absolute one. They
are also required to waive this immunity in case it impeded the cause of justice. 542 But
again the problem lies in the discretion of the IFIs to take a positive initiative. 543 The
problem also gets more complicated when some domestic legislation grant immunity to
IFIs. For example, the International Organizations Immunity Act (IOIA) issued by the
USA, which applies to IFIs, entails that “all organizations declared by the president to be
IOS shall enjoy the same immunity from suit as is enjoyed by foreign governments.” 544
Theoretically and based on IFIs constitutive instruments, they are granted functional
immunity, but in practice they enjoy absolute immunity from jurisdiction of national
courts.545 This means that private individuals are abandoned without providing any
remedy via any mechanism. The expansion in the IFIs mandates without a relative
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expansion in its accountability leaded to tension between the organization’s immunity
and the right of private individuals for remedy. 546 Thus, “immunity remains a silver bullet
protecting IFIs against questions of justice from private individuals affected by IFI’s
operations.”547
2.

Legal Basis of the Right to Health in Egypt:

The legal basis of the right to health is divided into two dimensions; the legal texts and
the procedural conditions. Due to the importance of the right to health for all human
beings, this right has not only been stated under international human rights instruments,
but has also been stipulated in domestic laws. Article 18 of the 2014 Egyptian
Constitution has stated the right to health and detailed the obligations incurred upon the
state in fulfillment of this right. The article stated
Every citizen is entitled to health and to comprehensive health care with quality
criteria. The state guarantees to maintain and support public health facilities that
provide health services to the people, and work on enhancing their efficiency and
their fair geographical distribution. The state commits to allocate a percentage of
government expenditure that is no less than 3% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
to health. The percentage will gradually increase to reach global rates. The state
commits to the establishment of a comprehensive health care system for all
Egyptians covering all diseases. The contribution of citizens to its subscriptions or
their exemption therefrom is based on their income rates. Denying any form of
medical treatment to any human in emergency or life-threatening situations is a
crime. The state commits to improving the conditions of physicians, nursing staff,
and health sector workers, and achieving equity for them. All health facilities and
health related products, materials, and health-related means of advertisement are
subject to state oversight. The state encourages the participation of the private and
public sectors in providing health care services as per the law. 548
The above article has drawn the guidelines required, to be followed by the state, to ensure
the fulfillment of the right to healthcare, which could be summarized in five main points.
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First, the constitution granted the right to all citizens and conditioned the services
provided to be of quality. Second, there is an obligation on the government to allocate a
percentage of the government expenditure to health. Third, the state is obliged to create a
health care system to all citizens, while protecting emergency cases. Fourth, create better
conditions for all medical staff to ensure the efficiency of the healthcare services
provided to the citizens by these professions. Last but not least, the health sector is
subject to the supervision of the state.
In addition to the protection of the right to healthcare under the constitution, this right has
been highlighted in the ICESCR under article 12. 549 Egypt has signed this Covenant in
1967 and ratified it in 1982.550 It is worth noting that based on article 93 of the 2014
Egyptian constitution; this Covenant has the force of law within the Egyptian legal
system, as the article states that
The state is committed to the agreements, covenants, and international
conventions of human rights that were ratified by Egypt. They have the force of
law after publication in accordance with the specified circumstances.551
Consequently, based upon the Egyptian constitution and the ICESCR, which Egypt is a
party to, it is found that Egypt has paid due attention to the importance of this right and
formulated a solid legal basis for the protection of this right.
The second dimension for the legal basis of the right to health is the procedural aspect. In
this regard, it is important to examine who has the right to file a case claiming the breach
of his/her right before the State Council courts or before the Supreme Constitutional
Court. Article 12 of the Egyptian State Council law number 47 for the year 1972 has
stated that claims will not be accepted, if submitted by persons who have no personal
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interest in such claim. 552 Accordingly, the law limited the right to claim the breach of the
right to health to the person or group of persons whom their right has been directly
breached.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Constitutional Court has its own law number 48 for the year
1979, which specifies the mechanism by which cases are filed before this court under
articles (29), (31) and (32).553 These articles have mentioned four cases under which
claims could be filed. Article (29) mentioned two of these cases where the Supreme
Constitutional Court would have judicial supervision over the constitutionality of law and
regulations. The first case if one of the courts while adjudicating a case considers the
unconstitutionality of a law or a regulation, then it stops the case and files it to the SCC to
examine it. The second case if one of the litigants to a case claimed the
unconstitutionality of a law or a regulation, then the court has the right to consider this
claim, stop the adjudication process and provide the concerned litigant with a period of
three months to file the claim of the unconstitutionality before the SCC. Article (31)
stated that any concerned person has the right to present a claim before the SCC to decide
upon the competent court to adjudicate a case, in case there is a dispute upon the
competent court. Lastly, article (32) has given any concerned person the right to file a
case before the SCC when there are two final contradicting decisions for the same case
issued by two different courts.
In this respect, there are legal texts stipulating the right to health of Egyptian citizens and
specifying the obligations incurred upon the state to fulfill this right. Furthermore, there
are courts to adjudicate cases related to this right, whether to present a claim before the
State Council appealing an administrative decree issued by the government or to present
a case to consider the constitutionality of a law or a regulation that might form a breach
for the right to healthcare as stated under the constitution. Thus, the extent of
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justiciability of the right to health could be observed from the angle of legal precedents
by Egyptian courts.
3.

Egyptian Civil Society and State Council Decisions:

The activity of the civil society in Egypt will be examined via two organizations, which
are: the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights ‘EIPR’ and the Egyptian Center for
Economic and Social Rights ‘ECESR’. First, the EIPR has been established in 2002 and
it is concerned with strengthening and protecting rights and freedoms in Egypt “through
research, advocacy and supporting litigation in the fields of civil liberties, economic and
social rights, and criminal justice.” 554 Second, the ECESR is a nongovernmental legal
institution, which was established in 2009. 555 Its mission is to work “through litigation,
research, data providing and campaigning to patronize and protect economic and social
rights and expand their domain.” 556
The EIPR has been concerned with the health program since 2008 to realize and protect
the right to health in Egypt. 557 From its approaches in this regard is the decision to litigate
against government decisions that may impede the protection and realization of the right
to health. However, litigation is not an easy resort as “legal pathways are long, costly and
have limited enforcement capacities.”558 However, litigation is still perceived as an
essential approach that “human rights organizations adopt in their attempts to protect and
guarantee the realization of the rights by the state.”559
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The outcome of litigation is not always guaranteed to be in favor of the plaintiff who
requires the realization of the right to health, so it is worth presenting two cases, each
with a different outcome. The first case is considered the successful form of litigation
which was the case of the Health Insurance Holding Company. In 2007, the Egyptian
Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif issued decree number 637/2007 for the establishment of the
“Healthcare Holding Company”. 560 The problem in this decree is that it transferred the
ownership of all hospital and facilities owned by the Health Insurance Organization
‘HIO’, which is a publicly owned insurance entity funded by contributions deducted from
public employees, to this new company. 561 So the government shifted the HIO into a
private company instead of improving its services. 562 Thus, the EIPR backed by 50 civil
society organizations appealed the mentioned decree on three grounds. These grounds are
that the decree went beyond the scope of the Prime Minister’s competency, was not
presented to the parliament and that it is considered a direct violation for Egypt’s
obligation to realize the right to health. 563 This made the decree unconstitutional and an
infringement to the ICESCR and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
where Egypt is a signatory to both conventions. 564 The Egyptian Administrative Court
issued a historical decision in favor of the EIPR’s appeal, which resulted in an essential
consequence. 565 The ruling limited the government’s ability to justify its decisions based
on the notion of limited resources. 566 As the court mentioned that the right of policy
makers in adopting new policies is “conditional upon its abiding by law governing public
property and citizens’ rights to accessible, affordable services.”567 The second case was
not successful as the first one. The case was that the Minister of Health issued decree
number 373/2009 to issue a new system for medicines’ pricing in Egypt.568 This system
based the pricing of medicine on “generic and patented medications in other countries,
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instead of setting the medication price according to the actual national cost of
production.”569 This system was in favor of pharmaceutical companies and acted against
the rights of citizens for the access of affordable medicines. The administrative court in
2010 ruled in favor of EIPR’s appeal, but the higher court accepted the government’s
appeal and validated the minister’s decision. 570

In addition to the above mentioned cases related to the right to health, there are other
cases filed before the State Council for the electricity price increase, which could
indirectly affect the right to health of citizens. In 2014, a plaintiff filed a case before the
administrative court requiring cancellation of the Prime Minister’s decree number
1257/2014, which stipulated gradual increase in electricity prices over a period of five
years starting from 2014 till 2018, as this increase would impede the plaintiff’s rights
stated in the constitution. 571 The court rejected the plaintiff’s request on the basis that the
administrative entity has the sole discretion to set the prices of electricity. 572 A similar
case was filed by the ECESR, but the ruling is unpublished by the Center. The case was
filed by ECESR on behalf of a citizen in 2012 against the Cabinet’s decision to increase
electricity prices by 7% with a future target rate of 15%.573 The ECESR appeal basis was
that the increase in electricity prices
added to that the cost of the other general services like Telephone, Gas, Water and
Transportation, as well as commodity prices for family living and Health cost,
which clearly shows that any increases in the prices of public services would
constitute a large economic strain on the family and deprive them of the
possibility of achieving a balance between acquired income and a decent living
hood. The rising prices of electricity and taxes would force households to
abandon part of the food consumption or needed health service in order to pay the
bills, especially in view of the low wages and pensions in the society, and the
absence of a minimum wage that commensurate with the consumer basket and the
569
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average sustenance ratio in the society, which means that new electricity prices,
and by extension rest of the services, will increase the gap – that is already
widened – between wages and prices.574
The above mentioned cases demonstrate the appeals against administrative decisions
issued by the government, but what is the possibility for citizens to challenge an
international agreement concluded by the State like the EFF concluded between Egypt
and the IMF. In this context, two aspects must be examined; the State Council law and
precedents issued by administrative courts.

The State Council law no.47 issued in 1972 states the competence of the State Council
courts under article 10. This article enumerated 14 cases of competence, all of which
revolve around the right of citizens and public servants to appeal against administrative
decisions. Yet, article 11 of the mentioned law limited the scope of the State Council by
explicitly stating that State Council courts have no jurisdiction to review requests or
appeals related to acts of sovereignty. So does the international agreement between Egypt
and the IMF as an IO considered an act of sovereignty by Egypt or not? Despite the
clarity of the text of the law, the problem is that there is no clear definition or an
exhaustive list for the acts that are to be considered acts of sovereignty. In this respect,
there are some court rulings that drew a framework to define the acts that could fall under
the category of acts of sovereignty.

The Egyptian Court of Cassation, the Supreme Constitutional Court and the Higher
Administrative Court have clarified in their rulings the criteria upon which acts of
sovereignty could be determined. The Court of Cassation in its ruling number 11513
issued in the judicial year number 84 in the commercial circuit held on 12 March 2019
stipulated the conditions that an act must fulfill to be considered an act of sovereignty,
which could be summarized in three aspects.575 First, the act must be issued in a political
context to satisfy political considerations. Second, it should be issued by the executive
574
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authority as the State’s ruling body. Third, the aim of the act must be for a public interest,
respects the constitution, supervises the State’s relations with other States, and to ensure
the State’s internal and external safety. The Supreme Constitutional Court adopted the
same criteria in its ruling number 48 for the judicial year number 4, held on 21 January
1984. The ruling demonstrated that the agreement concluded between Arab states for the
establishment of Arab army is considered an act of sovereignty, by which it has no
jurisdiction over it.576 Furthermore, the same court in its ruling for case number 12 for
judicial year 39 held on 7 March 2018 stated that international agreements concluded
between the State (Egypt) and other subjects of public international law, whether states or
international organizations is considered a political act.577 Persuaded by the above
mentioned criteria and court rulings, the Higher Administrative Court established a legal
principle regarding international agreements. It demonstrated that international
agreements fall under the category of acts of sovereignty; accordingly they are out of the
scope of judicial jurisdiction.578 However, the administrative decrees issued by the state in
application for the terms of the agreement and affected the citizens of the state falls under
judicial jurisdiction. 579

4.

The Supreme Constitutional Court:

It is pivotal to observe the mechanism by which the Supreme Constitutional Court ‘SCC’
interpret law, in particularly where it stands from international law and international
treaties to which Egypt is a party. The 2014 constitution stated under article (151) that:
The President of the Republic represents the state in foreign relations and
concludes treaties and ratifies them after the approval of the House of
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Representatives. They shall acquire the force of law upon promulgation in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.580

Moreover, article (93) under the same constitution
Expressly recognizes the force of law for all agreements, covenants and
international human rights conventions that were ratified by Egypt only after
official publication.581
However, the constitution did not provide a constitutional mechanism to guarantee that
international human rights law is applied in the domestic legal system. 582 As neither did
the 2014 Constitution nor the previous constitutions “require the SCC to follow a
particular technique in constitutional interpretation.”583 Yet, it is worth mentioning that
the SCC, through a number of high-profile opinions, has taken concrete steps in
considering the standards of international human rights law. 584 The SCC has taken into
consideration a wide array of international law sources in its decision making, including
multilateral international human rights conventions, customary international law, and
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. 585 This is useful to “reduce
clashes between domestic constitutional law and international law,” 586 as well as “to
ensure consistency between constitutional interpretation and international human rights
system.”587
Derived from the approach adopted by the SCC in it constitutional interpretation to
consider international law and treaties, three cases could be presented in this regard. First,
the SCC in its ruling for case number (8) for the year (1995), when interpreting article 40
of the 1971 Constitution related to the equality in the rights and obligations between all
580
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citizens, considered the UN Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons. The ruling
allowed the government to allocate 5% for disabled persons in governmental
institutions. 588 The SCC ruling stated that:
While the international law norms adopted by the General Assembly do not have
any binding force that could grant them an affirmative effect into the Egyptian
legal system, acknowledging them in internal legal systems should be regarded as
a moral and a political obligation that all states must fulfill. 589
The second case is number (34) for the year (1996), where the SCC stipulated that article
(2) and (16) of the Law number (48 of 1982) is constitutional. 590 This law “prohibited the
discarding of solid, gaseous or liquid waste into the Nile.”591 The Court based its decision
on the right to development provided under several international instruments as the
International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights and the UN Declaration for the
Right to Development.592 Furthermore, the third case is the SCC ruling in case number
(40) for the year (1995), where the court considered article 3(1) of Law no. (99) for
(1992) as unconstitutional, because it discriminated between students of public and
private educational institutions. 593 The court interpreted article (18) of the 1971
Constitution, which provides the constitutional right to education, in the light of
international instruments that guarantee the right to education as the ICESCR. 594

It is worth mentioning that in some cases where courts adjudicated in cases with conflict
between national and international law, they applied the more recent one. 595 An example
for this case is the Supreme Emergency Court ruling in 1986 regarding railroad workers
strike. 596 Article (124) of the Egyptian Penal Code adopted in 1937 criminalized strikes
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by public officials and those working for governmental institutions. 597 Meanwhile, article
8(d) of the ICESCR, which was ratified by Egypt in 1982, guaranteed the right to
strike. 598 The mentioned court considered the ICESCR article as it superseded the penal
code and had equal authority in the domestic legislation.599

Thus, the SCC considers international law in its constitutional interpretation to ensure the
harmony between domestic and international law. In addition, this approach minimizes
the possibility of invoking state responsibility for breaching its international
obligations. 600

In light of the above, it could be concluded that there are available remedies within the
domestic legal system in Egypt in case there is a breach of the right to health. The basis
of these remedies are legal texts in the constitution and international instruments that
Egypt is a party to and obtain the force of law as stated under the constitution. On the
other, the courts are considered the tool by which this right is shielded. However, the
courts are not always taking the side of the citizen claiming the breach of his right. Yet,
this does not deny the fact that the courts consider this right in other cases and takes the
initiative to protect it.
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V.

Conclusion

The IMF was primarily established to help countries facing balance of payment problems
to stabilize their economy and to take concrete steps towards economic reform. However,
due to extending their mandates and applying harsh conditionality on the borrowing
country, their policies have caused harm to some economies.
The EFF given to Egypt in 2016 is a clear example for the negative effect of
conditionality on the economic reform process, due to implementation of aggressive
austerity measures. The devastating effect on the economy has limited the government’s
ability to allocate sufficient resources for the health sector. This resulted in adversely
affecting the right to health of Egyptian citizens guaranteed by the constitution and by
article 12 of the ICESCR. The increase in inflation and poverty affected the accessibility
of the right to health. The private individual is the one who suffers the most from the
deteriorating economic circumstances resulting from policies accompanying the EFF of
the IMF. The effect is further worsened by the lack of available remedies for private
individuals.
From an international perspective, the IMF flees accountability for its policies. First,
there is no adequate internal mechanism for legal remedies. Second, the IMF cannot be
brought before domestic courts as it enjoys immunity construed under its constitutive
instrument. Third, the IMF, as other IFIs, refuses to abide by the right to remedy
established under customary international law and are reluctant to consider human rights
in their operations.
From a domestic perspective, private individual’s only resort are domestic courts by
appealing decrees issued by the government, which were issued in implementation of the
conditionality of the IMF. So, the IMF escapes the responsibility and refuses to share the
risk of the consequences of its policies with the borrowing government.
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